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The aim of this research is twofold.  The first is to gauge the efficacy of Basel III 
which is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s response to the global 
financial crisis that broke out in the summer of 2007, while the second is the 
examination of the role of law in crisis. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision is the international agency tasked with standard setting for 
internationally active banks and within this remit is the charge to position these 
banks to withstand crisis and possibly forestall the outbreak or spread of crisis. 
One the other hand, the concept of law serves as an original, self-creating 
justification for regulating human conduct. Law has a number of unique features 
that may benefit international banking regulation. As the global community 
becomes ever smaller and systemic risk continues to plague the already heavily 
interconnected global financial system, these investigations are important to 
ensure the growth and development benefits of a stable global financial and 
economic system are enhanced.    
To meet this aim, this research investigates the doctrine behind the way law is 
used to check crisis. Since the primary reason for the accord in the global 
financial crisis and crisis represents crash in a financial system, hence 
inefficiency, the research pairs law with economics to determine whether 
efficiency is to be had in the present state. The data relied upon is secondary data 
from the extensive literature that exists on each of the subject matters. In the end, 
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the research findings are that Basel III is an improvement on Base II but may be 
plagued by implementation issues like its predecessors and that the is a 
likelihood of another financial crises and the BCBS is doomed to be reactionary 
rather that preventive.  Also, lacking the coercive quality of law, international 
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In the summer of 2007, a global financial crisis broke out. This crisis has shaken 
the very foundation of the global financial architecture and revealed, more than 
ever before, the extent of the economic and financial interconnectedness and 
interdependence of the world. As with catastrophes such as this, researchers, 
governments, international financial institutions and agencies, and commentators 
immediately set out to understand the phenomenon and its causes. While the 
curiosity of academia was naturally more centred on an investigation of the 
phenomenon for intellectual purposes, governments and other agencies were 
more interested in determining pathways and adjustments to tackle the instant 
outbreak and possibly prevent a similar or other crisis in the future. All of this 
curiosity and actual work has resulted in an ever-growing literature on the crisis 
as well as a tide of amendments to existing regulations and the introduction of 
new regulation. Among the regulatory responses is Basel III by the Banking 
Committee for Banking Supervision (the committee or BCBS). Basel III seeks to 
reposition internationally active banks to better withstand crises such as the 2007 
one and possibly repel future crises. This research gauges Basel III as a response 
to the global financial crisis and ultimately examines the role of law in the 
management of financial crisis.  
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The global financial crisis has been blamed on activities predicated on years of 
defective macroeconomic policies i.e. the failure of unbounded capitalism1 and 
institutional failures i.e. failure of regulators and regulation2. These factors, as 
well as others, were the fuel upon which the spark the subprime mortgage 
practices in the United States and the hugely profitable market for investment 
vehicles created therefrom, burnt violently. The ensuing panic upon a succession 
of defaults created a liquidity squeeze felt mostly in financial intermediaries such 
as banks and from the banks the crunch was transmitted to the real economy.3 At 
the centre of the crisis were banks, particularly internationally active banks.4 
Kim captures international banks interestingly by limiting a bank’s basic 
dimensions to having a parenting organisation, possession of the appropriate 
facilities and products, and the existence of a customer base for their products 
and services. And if one or more of these dimensions transcend national 
boundaries, the services rendered may be deemed international banking services 
and the entity itself, an international bank.5 International banks typically carry on 
business in more than one country and have become an important part of both 
the international financial system as well as national economies where they 
operate. Apart from the important benefits these entities offer as banking 
                                                          
1 See Adam Szyszka and Yochanan Shachmurove, ‘The financial crisis: What is there to 
learn?’ (2011) 22 GFJ 238 
2 See Ricardo Cabral, ‘A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis’ (2013) 
37 JBF 103 
3 See Eric Helleiner, ‘Understanding the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for 
Scholars of International Political Economy’ (2011) 14 ARPS 67 
4 See Schnabl, P, ‘Financial Globalization and the Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: 
Evidence from an Emerging Market’ (2012) 67(3) JF 897 
5 See Taeho Kim, International  Money and Banking (Routledge 1993) 
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institutions; the nature of their structure and practices makes them a peculiar and 
frequent conduit for the transfer of contagion to or from the real economy or 
between economies. This systemic risk posed by their cross-border nature serves 
as the most important factor in the regulation of international banks.6  
To put Basel III as a regulatory response to crisis in perspective, one must 
appreciate not only financial crises, but also the concept of regulation and the 
factors affecting international regulation. A financial crisis is a sudden crash in a 
financial system that impairs its functionality. These crashes usually unravel by 
way of an unexpected drop in asset value, together with a hasty, panicked 
withdrawal of funds from financial institutions.7 Financial crises have occurred 
in one form or another since mercantile society took form. The reasons for, types 
of, palliative steps, and preventive measures of financial crises have fascinated 
political scientists, economists, and other writers since the earliest instances of 
financial crises. 8   The resultant literature is considerable and steep in 
microeconomic theory and policies as the bases of the health of any economy. 
The perennial debate about the exact origin and nature of financial crises benefits 
either side of the debate with regard to whether crises are inbuilt or freakish 
temporary blips in an otherwise stable system depending on the peculiar 
                                                          
6 See Hasman, Augusto, ‘A Critical Review of Contagion Risk in Banking’ (2013) 27(5) JES 
978; M. K. Lewis and K T Davis, Domestic and International Banking (MIT Press 1987) 
7 See Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(Wiley 2005)  
8 See Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogof, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly (Princeton University Press 2009) 
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manifestation of each instance of crisis. 9  It is noteworthy however that the 
peculiarities of the recent global crises bear out the theories of an inherent 
propensity to a correction after a period of greed, wanton financial exuberance, 
and deregulation leading to the proverbial Minsky moment.10  
Regulation, on the other hand, is problematic to define11 but for our purposes, it 
shall entail the direct lawful influence of the activities of subjects and the 
resultant instruments of this process. This process encompasses the direction of 
the actions of subjects who may not be subjects of the regulator but are under an 
obligation to comply. This obligation is not necessarily owed to the regulator, 
but to the system that allows for the exercise of the power to regulate.12 The will 
behind any regulatory effort goes a long way in determining what regulation 
really is and its purpose in society. Hence, to fully appreciate regulatory effort, 
one must determine whether it is a restriction or the encouragement of certain 
behaviour that is intended and to what purpose.13 Regulation entails the existence 
of an indirect relationship in which the regulator is not required to enjoy a direct 
                                                          
9 See Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of 
Finance (Penguin Books 2010); Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy 
(McGraw-Hill 2008) 
10 See L. Randall Wray ‘Minsky's Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2011)  40(2) IJPE 5; Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, Crisis Economics: A Crash Course 
in the Future of Finance (Penguin Books 2010)  
11 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation Text and 
Materials (CUP 2007)   
12 See Kenneth J Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics (St. Martin's Press 
1985)  
13 See Barry M. Mitnick The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and 
Removing Regulatory Forms (CUP 1980)  
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benefit from the endeavour sought to be regulated.14 Regulation is not always the 
activity or process of creating these directions or restrictions as it also describes 
the instruments (body of specific rules) created therefrom. In Llewellyn’s words, 
regulation in the financial sphere, is ‘a body of specific rules or agreed 
behaviour… [that] limits the activities and business operations of financial 
institutions.’15  
One instance of the financial institutions contemplated in Llewellyn’s definition 
of financial regulation is an international bank. Now even though regulation of 
banks is notoriously strict as a result of the important role a bank plays with 
regard to the economic soundness and financial safety of an economy and indeed 
the world, 16  and international banking services evolved and developed at a 
relatively fast pace, efforts at establishing uniform international standards only 
found fulfilment in recent decades in the founding and work of the BCBS which 
was formed with the mandate of supervising the activities of internationally 
active banks.17 This work of the committee has removed the regulation of cross 
border banking from the purview of domestic regulation.18 Basel III which is the 
                                                          
14 ibid 
15 D. T Llewellyn, ‘The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institution’ (1986) TIB 9 
16 See L Jacobo Rodriguez, ‘Banking stability and the Basel capital standards’ (2003-2004) 23 
CJ 115 
17 See Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision A History of the Early 
Years, 1974–1997 (CUP 2011) ;Patricia A. McCoy, ‘Musings on the seeming inevitability of 
global convergence in banking law’ (2000-2001) 7 CILJ 433; Emmanuel N. Roussakis,  
‘Global Banking: Origins and Evolution’ (1997) 37(4) ACFSP 45 
18 See Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W Arner, ‘Toward a new design for International Financial 
Regulation’ (2007) 29(2) UPJIL 39; Patricia A. McCoy, ‘Musings on the seeming inevitability 
of global convergence in banking law’ (2000-2001) 7 CILJ 433 
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third in the series of accords the committee has released is the “international 
banking” regulatory reaction to the global financial crisis and has the mandate to 
bolster the banking sector with regard to its ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress. The accord also seeks to improve risk 
management and governance practices, enhance transparency, and ultimately 
prevent another crisis of a similar scale.19  
Every modern society has institutions and guidelines that restrict, control, and 
facilitate said restriction and control of the conduct of affairs in that society for 
the common good of the society. These institutions and guidelines constitute the 
concept known as law.  For purposes of this research, law is the sum of the self-
sufficient intangible authority that allows for processes and institutions for the 
maintenance of order in any society. Hence all the structures and agents 
deployed to maintain order and balance in any space comprising individuals or 
entities pursuing divergent and often conflicting ends are encompassed in the 
concept law.20 Law’s contribution in modern society is covered by its functions 
which include provision of amenities, defence of person and property, and - of 
particular importance to this thesis – the safeguard and facilitation of the 
                                                          
19 See Bank for International Settlements Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: 
A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (December 2010 
[rev June 2011]) < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf> accessed 6 July 2017 
20 See generally Richard Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law’ (2003) 
32(1) TS 1; H L A Hart, Of laws in General Jeremy Bentham 1748-1832 (Herbert Lionel 
Adolphus Continuum International Publishing Group 1970); Denis Galligan, Law in Modern 
Society (Oxford University Press 2007) 
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commercial cum financial activities in any society.21 One of the ways law does it 
is via regulation.  
 As noted above, one of the functions of law is the facilitation and safeguarding 
of commercial activities. This is where economic and financial regulation come 
into play. Economic regulation describes the actions the state or sovereign takes 
to ensure the struggle for control of resources within the state is fair and balances 
evenly with the atmosphere within which individuals may promote their 
financial self-interests and the state may prosper.22 Whether economic regulation 
or its subset, financial regulation, aims at the promotion of the public interest or 
serves as an instrument in the hands of interested parties to further their selfish 
aims, regulation remains is apparently an important instrument in society and its 
deployment to correct abnormalities is almost universally used and roundly 
appreciated.23 An important aspect of economic regulation is the complexity and 
sophistication of the entities it covers.24 These complex entities exist, function, 
and conform to rules exercised by an authority which itself is exercised or 
legitimised by an intangible popular agreement. Thus, regulation in this instance 
is a product of state action that seeks to ensure risky behaviour is curtailed for 
                                                          
21  See generally Joseph Raz, The authority of law: Essays on law and morality (Oxford 
Scholarship Online: March 2012); Jose P. Bengzon, ‘Law as a Function of the Social Order’ 
(1968) 43 PLJ 699; Ehrenberg, Kenneth M., The Functions of Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) 
22 T. Barton, ‘Prospects for a general theory of economic regulation’ (1989) 46 (1) WLLR 41 
23 See Posner, Richard A., ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5(2) BJEMS 335;  
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th edn, Macmillan 1932) 
24 Ioannis Glinavos, Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the Financial 
Crisis and the Future of Regulation (Routledge Research 2014)  
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the benefit of the system in which it operates. If regulation is the product in this 
conceptualisation, then the instrument used to deliver this product is law. Law is 
the basis of regulation. Law is the means of legitimacy on which regulation 
emanates as well as the machinery that ensures compliance.25  
Deep inquiry into the politics, ideology, and normative commitments that inform 
the regulation of international finance is beyond this research.26 Furthermore, the 
rules governing the regulatory powers, responsibility, and reach of the BCBS, as 
well as, whatever body of rules (whether written or unwritten) governing the 
enforceability of the standards and the debates surrounding the legitimacy, mode,  
and transparency of decision-making processes of the BCBS27 are only glossed 
over where the need arises. Finally, it is noted that Basel III is not strictly 
speaking a regulatory instrument as standard setting activities of agencies under 
the parent body of the BCBS, the BIS, do not carry the force of law and are not 
considered treaties under international law. They are not binding but tend to 
enjoy considerable global compliance informed by many countries’ need to 
benefit from the recognition adhering to best standards bestows.28 However, the 
                                                          
25  See Morgan, B and Yeung, K, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press 2007); Ioannis Glinavos, Redefining the Market-State 
Relationship: Responses to the Financial Crisis and the Future of Regulation (Routledge 2014) 
26 See generally Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International 
Economic Order (Princeton University Press 2001)  
27 For a general discussion on these, see Sanaa Ahmed, ‘The Politics of Financial Regulation’ 
(2015)11 SLR 61  
28 See Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources’ 
(2007) 93 ILR 65; Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, 
Revised Basle Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments 
(May 1983) <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017 where it is 
stated that ‘The report deals exclusively with the responsibilities of banking supervisory 
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accords remain the closest thing to regulation in the international banking 
sphere.29  
An important aspect of international or global financial regulation 30  is the 
diffusion of responsibility that arises from the arduousness of holding a 
particular regulator or body responsible for its implementation and enforcement. 
They are examples of ‘transnational non-state regulatory regimes’. The 
regulation envisaged in this model is typically carried out by nongovernmental 
organisations, civil society groups, non-state regulatory authorities etc.31 In this 
context, regulation refers to any means directed at guiding individuals, 
institutions, and activities to align with formal or informal rules. 32  
Notwithstanding, since financial stability is recognised as a global public good 
affording benefit to virtually every country irrespective of its contribution, or 
lack thereof, to its attainment, it is still important to examine the incentive for the 
BCBS to ensure that international banking standards, at their core, are effective 
and flexible enough to enable as many countries as possible to conform to a set 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
authorities for monitoring the prudential conduct and soundness of the business of banks’ 
foreign establishments. It does not address itself to lender-of-last-resort aspects of the role of 
central banks.’ 
29 See Melissa Boey, ‘Regulating Bankerspace: Challenging the Legitimacy of the Basel 
Accords as Soft Law’ (2014) 87 SCLRP 74  
30 See John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) where the globalisation of financial regulation is defined 
as ‘the spread of some set of regulatory norms’ 
31 See Natasha Tusikov, ‘Transnational non-state regulatory regimes’ in Peter Drahos (ed), 
Regulatory theory: foundations and applications (ANU Press 2017) 
32 See Picciotto, S, ‘Introduction: Reconceptualising regulation in the era of globalisation’, 
(2002) 29(1) JLS 1 
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of common standards.33 Also, since there is substantial evidence that the number 
of worldwide banking crises, their severity, and cost to society, including 
government bailouts, have increased significantly since 1970 34 , there is the 
likelihood of another financial crisis involving international banks in the future. 
And if there is, the BCBS will either tweak the existing accord or introduce a 
brand new one. But before then, the strength of the latest response must be 
gauged. A clear understanding of the nuances of financial crises and the 
appropriate considerations in the formulation and deployment of appropriate 
regulation will go a long way to aid this endeavour.  
 
Methodology 
This research is carried out principally in law. For this reason, whatever 
methodological approach utilized must be compatible with legal research. Legal 
research methodologies range from doctrinal to, socio-legal, critical, and 
comparative research. This list however is ever expanding and now includes 
approaches such as Marxist theory, feminism, Queer theory, post-colonial theory, 
constitutionalism, liberalism, and the “law and …” genres i.e. law and economics, 
                                                          
33 Hellvig Robert Claudiu, ‘The regulation necessity of the international financial and banking 
system’ (2015) 32 PEF  968  
34 C. W. Calomiris and S. H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking 
Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton University Press 2014) 
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law and psychology, etc.35 This research is carried out using a hybrid of the 
doctrinal and the law and economics methodologies. 
Of importance to any legal study is to determine that the underlying doctrine is 
clearly articulated.  The next step is to establish that the doctrine is followed. 
These steps enable the researcher to determine whether defects or uncertainties 
are a result of faulty doctrine or defective compliance with an otherwise sound 
doctrine36and this is the essence of doctrinal research. Doctrine in law is ‘a 
synthesis of rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It 
explains, makes coherent or justiﬁes a segment of the law as part of a larger 
system of law’.37 Thus, doctrine is the basis of any legal pursuit; the underlying 
thought that forms its foundations and governs procedure. 
Doctrinal research proceeds from the determination and examination of doctrine 
and was the dominant method of research scholarship in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. 38  Legal doctrinal research however, possesses as a feature, an 
unrelenting formalism that has been criticised as lacking in social conditions and 
insights and this has led to a rebellion of sorts. This rebellion against doctrinal 
research has led to the introduction and proliferation of “socio-legal” research 
                                                          
35 See See Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law from Posner to 
Post Modernism and Beyond (Princeton University Press 2006) 
36 See Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 




methodologies that seek to ensure emphasis lies on awareness of social and 
economic factors that affect laws and decision-making.39  
One of the results of this marriage between law and the social sciences, and of 
importance to this research, is law and economics. Mercuro and Medema define 
law and economics ‘as the application of economic theories – primarily 
microeconomics and the basic concepts of welfare economics – to examine the 
formation, structure, processes and economic impact of law and legal 
institutions.’40 The principal focus of economics is the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources. Thus for proponents of this approach, an economic approach to 
legal analysis will bring the advantage of the search of efficiency in the 
application of law. Some have argued that all analysis of the law should have 
efficiency as a standard and that since policy debates always agonise about the 
direction in which law should go, an evaluation of the efficiency of each position 
not only yields better results but also allows for clarity in the consideration. The 
focus of how economic analysis of the law should proceed is not clear-cut as 
various schools battle for predominance within this approach. These include the 
                                                          
39 See Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law (Harvard 
University Press 1974); Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law 
from Posner to Post Modernism and Beyond (Princeton University Press 2006);  Martha 
Minow, ‘Law Turning Outward’ (1987) 73 T 79 
40 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law from Posner to Post 
Modernism and Beyond (Princeton University Press 2006) 
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Chicago school approach, public choice theory, institutional law and economics, 
and the new institutional economics.41 
The doctrinal approach proceeds by identifying the existing doctrine, analysing it 
to determine its validity, and proceeds to determine where defects in its 
implementation lie. Doctrinal research, in spite of criticism of its rigidity, is an 
unavoidable starting point for this research. The research delves into law as a 
means of social control and it is important to determine first what doctrines 
inform the deployment of financial law, especially during or in response to crisis.. 
The literature on the subject matters of this research cover international banking 
and its regulation, regulation, financial crises, the global financial crisis of 2007, 
Basel III, and commentary on Basel III as a regulatory response to the crisis and 
these emanate from various disciplines such as  Economics, Law, and Banking 
and Finance. The interdisciplinary nature of the research necessitates the 
utilization of a methodology that not only accommodates transdisciplinarity42 but 
also remains connected to the primary focus of law. The choice of law and 
economics is informed by the unique quality of economics in the fold of social 
sciences, which is that its emphasis is more on approach rather than content.43 
This interaction of law and economics has the unique benefit of promoting an 
                                                          
41 ibid 
42 Used here to highlight how the research focus traverses different disciplines 
43 See Becker, Gary S., The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (The University of 
Chicago Press 1976) 
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improved understanding which may then be used to enhance the quality of legal 
systems.44 
For this research, after arriving at the underlying doctrines using the doctrinal 
methodology, an economic analysis is applied to determine whether the BCBS’s 
reforms represent the rational choice in the circumstance. The research procedure 
is the examination of existing literature on each of the subject-matters as 
secondary data and reaching conclusions therefrom.  
 
Contents 
The content structure of this research is as follows. The first chapter introduces 
law, regulation, and crises as some of the subject-matters on which this study is 
carried out. The chapter defines and discusses each of the concepts.  Each of 
these concepts is crucial and has attracted a considerable amount of debate and 
discussion such that the literature is large and daunting. However, the chapter 
discusses the role of law in society, the nature of regulation, and the relationship 
between law and regulation. And the dimensions for a full understanding of 
crises and law factors into them are explored.  Chapter 2 moves the discussion 
onto international banking. The chapter examines how international banking 
grew to become the integral part of modern society. The chapter traces the 
                                                          
44 See Dirk Heremans, Katrien Bosquet, ‘The Future of Law and Finance after the Financial 




historical development and examines the systemic importance of international 
banks and as globalization ensures financial and economic activities become 
more trans-national and these entities attain more significance to the global 
financial system, the chapter also analyses the attempts and the present state of 
their regulation. The evolution of international banking has brought with it both 
benefits and challenges and these are covered in this chapter. Chapter 3 
continues the discussion on international banks but narrows the discussion to the 
BCBS and its accords. The chapter covers the incidents necessitating the creation 
of the BCBS and the developments that informed the accords it has released so 
far. Further in this chapter, the build-up to the global financial crisis which broke 
out in 2007 is considered and the trajectory that resulted in Basel III is drawn. 
Finally in this chapter, the exact reforms in Basel III are highlighted. Chapter 4 
analyses the global financial crisis to elicit the lessons therefrom. In this chapter 
it is demonstrated that Basel III’s shortcomings and the fact that crises are 
unpredictable will almost certainly ensure another crisis strikes. Further, the 
discussion covers the inability of law to aid the regulation of crisis. The thesis 
ends with a conclusion chapter where it is suggested that the present Basel 





CHAPTER 1: LAW, REGULATION, AND CRISES 
1.1 Introduction 
Law, regulation, and financial crises are some of the subject-matters on which 
this study is carried out. Each of these concepts is either constantly relevant in 
the modern society or of such impact in everyday life by virtue of its nature or 
occurrence that collectively, they have attracted a considerable amount of debate 
and discussion resulting in the existence of a daunting and constantly growing 
literature. Regardless, a consideration of the discussions and realities of each 
conjures up a fascinating new dimension of the relationship amongst them and 
how each interacts with the others. To make meaningful contributions to what is 
already known about crises and the various attempts at preventing and, as is 
frequently the case, ameliorating an outbreak of crisis while hoping to prevent a 
future outbreak, one must appreciate the still ongoing discussions of the 
meaning, causes, progression, and economic underpinnings of crisis. Attempts to 
‘check’ crisis typically comprise advancing policies or guidelines to fix lapses or 
control areas, sectors, acts, or actors deemed to be causal or contributory to the 
outbreak of crisis. This advancement of policies or guidelines is regulation. 
Hence the determination of the efficacy of a particular regulatory attempt to 
check crisis necessitates an understanding of what exactly regulation is in a 
financial context, and the considerations which drive its deployment. 
Furthermore, it is the existence of a structure that supports financial and 
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economic activities that creates the possibility of the misfortunes that are 
commonly referred to as financial crises. This structure must, as of necessity, be 
created and maintained by an entity or moulded on a concept. For the purposes 
of this research, that structure is society and the entity or concept that births and 
maintains it is law. This chapter serves to introduce the understanding of law, 
regulation, and crisis that will shape the rest of this research. The introductory 
discussion herein is to create a theoretical underpinning for the basis of the 
introduction of Basel III in response to the financial crisis.  
This chapter discusses the role of law in society, the nature of regulation, and the 
relationship between law and regulation. The chapter also examines the nature, 
causes, types, and theories of financial crises.   
 
1.2 Law 
The basis of the continued existence of modern society is the existence of 
order. 45  Each society is comprised of individuals and entities with personal 
interests, goals, desires, and urges they might attempt to fulfil, achieve, or 
pursue. The control of these interests, impulses, desires, and urges which 
embody the collective known as society presupposes processes and an authority 
that directs the way. These processes and authority that guarantee order are 
                                                          
45 See Richard Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law’ (Feb., 2003) 32(1) 
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collectively what is known as law. Hence, jurist and legal commentator, Jeremy 
Bentham famously describes law as the supreme instrument of achieving 
society’s goals.46 The search for this so called order is the classical justification 
for the existence of law and informs Weber’s well known definition; ‘An order 
will be called ... law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that physical 
or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of people in order to bring 
about compliance or avenge violation.’47 Law is in existence wherever there are 
institutions ensuring (enforcing) normative stipulations formulated to guarantee 
order in society.48 Law has become necessary, even essential in the survival of 
any society. The necessity of law encompasses the basic social tasks of 
protecting each individual from the excesses of all others, as well as, the orderly 
facilitation of such basic social engagements as agreements, property rights and 
dealings, as well as family relations.49  
Another approach to the basic understanding and appreciation of law is to view 
the concept as a conflict management tool. An iteration of this view of the utility 
of law may be found in a quote by Fuller; ‘Law is the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules.’50 Humans have evolved to live in a 
society and carry out tasks that are aimed at satisfying needs. These tasks involve 
                                                          
46 See H L A Hart, Of laws in General Jeremy Bentham 1748-1832 (Herbert Lionel Adolphus 
Continuum International Publishing Group 1970) 
47 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (first published 
1922, University of California Press 1978) 34 
48 See Richard Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law’ (Feb., 2003) 32(1) 
TS 1 
49 See Denis Galligan, Law in Modern Society (Oxford University Press 2007) 
50  Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven revised ed. 1969) 106 
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unavoidable interaction and these interactions, borne out of almost purely selfish 
impulses, guarantee conflict. This fact reveals what the exact business of Law is; 
the settlement of disputes as they arise, the institution of processes and 
institutions to encourage development and peaceful co-existence, and the 
avoidance of foreseeable disputes. For Kelsen, the tasks involved include 
prevention of disputes from arising and setting out procedures for settling 
disputes bound to arise in the future.51 Law’s task in society is principally that of 
holding the fabric of society together and ensuring the smooth running of its 
affairs. Thus, law exists in any society or organisation that has developed a 
distinct legal order. A legal order develops enforceable norms with the sole aim 
of regulating human behaviour.52 
The functions of law are specific as well as common to any society with any 
form of legal order. Identifying the functions of law is sine qua non in any 
enquiry into the nature and adequacy of existing laws. Identifying these 
functions aids the explanation of the interaction of other disciplines with Law 
and the determination of the principles that should guide the formulation of new 
laws.53 Raz identifies four heads of functions of law.  First, Law aims to prevent 
undesirable behaviour and promote desirable ones. As law seeks to tackle 
disputes in society, it stands to reason that the first step must be to discourage 
                                                          
51  See K N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (first 1930, New York 1960)  
52  See H Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy (Oxford Scholarship 
Online January 2009)  
53 See Joseph Raz, The authority of law: Essays on law and morality (Oxford Scholarship 
Online March 2012) 
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certain actions. The province of criminal law and the law of torts serve to punish 
– with a bid to deter in some circumstances and to exert society’s ‘pound of flesh’ 
in others– such acts as murder, robbery, kidnapping, sexual offences, trespass 
etc., as well as placing a liability for the breach of a duty of care while dealing 
with certain vulnerable persons or engaging in potentially dangerous activities. 
On the other hand, providing for specific powers and mandating the bearer to 
exercise them in specific events looks to take advantage of favourable 
circumstances for society’s benefit or ensuring the opportunity to right wrongs is 
not missed. Secondly, law facilitates private engagement amongst individuals. 
This function is the basis for the existence of a large part of private law. Certain 
elements of criminal law and the law of torts also fulfil this function. Under this 
head, law provides for such instruments and devices for the smooth actualization 
of society’s needs as marriage, trade unions, banks, companies, contracts etc. 
Thirdly, law facilitates the settlement of both disputes whose confines and 
resolution are expressly provided for and those not forbidden by any law (the 
behaviour may not even be obnoxious or undesirable in itself) but whose 
occurrence occasions loss or detriment to society. And finally, law is 
instrumental in ensuring efficient provision of services, as well as the 
distribution and redistribution of goods. Law provides this function by offering 
armed forces for protection against external aggression, establishment of some 
type of tax regime, providing arrangements for clearing sewage, construction and 
maintenance of roads, provision of health services, developing education, 
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regulating contracts and commercial activities, subsidizing the provision of 
essential services etc.54 
 
1.3 Regulation 
Regulation has been defined so often and with such variety that it has become 
difficulty to ascertain a generally accepted or applicable definition for the term.55 
The existing definitions tend to cater to either the discipline under which a 
definition is sought or the purpose for which the definition is sought.56 This has 
led to the existence of a plethora of specialised definitions alongside a few 
attempts at a multidisciplinary approach. A foremost attempt at a 
multidisciplinary approach is the definition of regulation as ‘any attempt by the 
government to control the behaviour of citizens, corporations, or sub 
governments.’57 Emphasis is on the act of a sovereign with regard to subjects just 
as much as its own agents. This definition of Meier’s presupposes the existence 
of an established social order or hierarchy and the need to maintain it by a 
controlling act. In contrast, Mitnick divorces the regulator from the sphere of the 
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regulation and instead places emphasis on the limitation of the choices available 
to the subjects of regulation.58 This suggests that regulation entails the existence 
of an indirect relationship in which the regulator is not required to enjoy a direct 
benefit from the endeavour sought to be regulated. For others, regulation is more 
an instrument than a process. In this instance, focus shifts from the actors onto 
the instrument.59 The process that produces this instrument is largely ignored and 
focus is on the resultant rules. These rules operate as behavioural limitations that 
are imposed or simply agreed upon and which ensure the smooth operation of a 
society, industry, or sector.60 Simply put, regulation is the particular instrument 
that conveys the will, decision, or agreed limitations consisting the entirety of the 
process of regulation.  
Hancher and Moran highlight the presupposition that the existence of the need to 
regulate, and indeed regulations, points at a social order sought to be defined or 
protected.61 The argument is that there must already be in existence some manner 
of ‘society’ which requires stipulations for its order or continued existence. 
There is also the presupposition that this society has an established hierarchy of 
power or influence. This means there should be in place an establishment that 
exercises some influence or has some authority over subjects and which also has 
as a task; the will, intention, and power of preserving the system of social 
                                                          
58 Barry M Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and 
Removing Regulatory Forms (CUP 1980) 5 
59 See D T Llewellyn, ‘The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institution’ (1986) IB 9 
60 ibid 
61 Hancher, L and Moran, M, Capitalism Culture, and Economic Regulation (OUP 1989) 
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organisation.62 A regulator, in exercise of the power or responsibility to ensure or 
protect the collective good, acts for the good of the collective by either 
establishing guidelines that ensure balance or fairness or setting up fora and 
institutions that ensure compliance or retribution in the event of default.  
The easy conclusion that may be drawn from the preceding paragraph is that 
regulation is the direct lawful influence of the activities of subjects in a collective 
by whatever name so called for the benefit of that collective.63 The use of the 
term subjects in this context does not indicate subordination in terms of 
hierarchy. Rather, the subjection intended refers to the implicit agreement to be 
bound by the resulting rules. Hence, regulation may emanate from a constituted 
authority just as well as an external body to the subjects of the regulation or may 
even be self-imposed. 64  The existence of regulation relies principally on 
influence. For regulation to exist there is the presupposition of a body or entity 
that wields influence that may ensure compliance. It is the influence that is 
exerted on a sector, industry, or society by an exerting authority either external 
or internal to the subjects that ensures the enforceability of the regulation. Hence, 
a professional association may empower members, who ordinarily do not enjoy 
privileges beyond their membership, to make rules for governing the association. 
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Regulation encompasses both the process leading to, and the resulting instrument 
of this lawful influence.65 
Another important factor in the discussion of regulation is the analysis of 
motives that drive regulation. The reasons for regulation include the need for 
fairness in dealings, the establishment of practical limits, attempts at achieving 
efficiency of resources, time and manpower, and to enshrine as much equality as 
possible in a society or organisation.66 The motives for regulation are implicit in 
the definition of regulation and depend heavily on the area of human endeavour 
sought to be regulated. In the instance of financial regulation seeking to 
preventing crisis or checking the spread of crisis, the obvious motives would be 
to establish practical limits for market participants and ensure efficiency is 
maintained. Another motive that drives regulation is the attempt to balance the 
inevitable clash of interests among members of any sector, industry, or section of 
society.67  
 
1.4 Law and Regulation  
The terms Law and regulation are frequently used interchangeably, whether in 
the description of the resultant instrument or the principal processes that result in 
the instrument (the second usage refers to the personification of the term ‘law’ in 
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academic treatises). Whether the concepts are interchangeable and the 
significance of any distinction between them is the subject of some debate. The 
debate exists and thrives mostly because of the varied definitions given of each 
of these concepts as well as the varied perspectives from which each has been 
considered.68  Regardless of the lack of consensus, it is important to identify the 
differences between them.  The importance of determining if a clear-cut 
distinction exists between these concepts lies in the importance of identifying the 
functions of each as distinct of the other as forms of social control. Also, a 
determination of the differences of the concepts will ensure the adequate 
consideration is put in the deployment of each. For instance, in the determination 
of how regulatory attempts at preventing or curbing financial crisis should be 
developed, it is important to determine if the solution sought lies in the area of 
regulation i.e. the establishment of the proper regulating authority, practices, and 
instruments, or in law i.e. the understanding of the basic order upon which 
society’s needs need to be conform to.  
Conceptually, regulation is the orderly direction of complex and sophisticated 
organisations responsible for the tasks that form the social structure of society.69 
The complexity of these organizations and the impact of their actions necessitate 
regulation. Law on the other hand provides for the existence, functioning, and 
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conformity to rules exercised by an authority which itself is exercised or 
legitimised by an intangible popular agreement. Thus, regulation is a product of 
state action that seeks to ensure risky behaviour is curtailed for the benefit of the 
system in which it operates. If regulation is the product in this conceptualisation, 
then the instrument used to deliver this product is law. Law is the basis of 
regulation. Law is the means of legitimacy on which regulation emanates as well 
as the machinery that ensures compliance.70  
It has been argued, and correctly, that regulation is principally a method of 
carrying out the functions of law.71 The role of law as a form of economic and 
social control in any society may be fulfilled through means other than 
regulation e.g. legal rules. The reach of law goes beyond the utilization of 
instruments such as regulation and legal rules as law also stands as an arbiter in 
instances where legal rules, as opposed to regulation that may be voluntary, clash 
with the collective expectations of the society. Furthermore, law includes the 
means of enforcement of both legal rules and regulation and is the totality of the 
machinery that creates a relationship that enables regulation and its enforcement. 
This is a particularly important distinction because it ensures that the facilitative 
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quality of law is so directed that it serves the best interests of regulatory efforts.72 
Thus, if the legal basis of any regulatory effort is sound, there are reasonable 
chances that the resultant regulation will effectively serve its purpose. 
 
1.5 Economic and Financial Regulation Gone Global 
While almost every facet of life may be the subject of regulation, of importance 
to the considerations of this research is regulation in the financial sphere. In an 
ideal world, markets function perfectly i.e. attain and remain in a state of Pareto 
optimality. This means demand and supply balance each other out and market 
competition is perfect. However, markets tend to diverge from perfect 
competition by a concept generally referred to as market failure. 73  Market 
failures are a justification for government action i.e. regulation. Weimer and 
Vining identify four traditional instances of market failure; inefficient 
distribution of public goods, the existence of natural monopolies, distortions 
brought about by externalities, and market information asymmetries. 74  First, 
injustice or incompetence in the distribution of public goods may clash with 
socially accepted beliefs of equality and this alters market outcome. Public goods 
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are such goods as are nonexclusive in their ownership or consumption and have 
the exclusive characteristic of being the preserve of the government to provide. 
Examples include healthcare, education, defence etc. Under this head, we also 
class the redistribution of income earned from taxation as taxes are the primary 
source of providing these goods. Second, a natural monopoly develops where 
low fixed cost of production of a product and a low aggregate demand give a 
specific firm the ability to restrict output relative to price such that its profit 
maximisation compromises economic efficiency. In other words, one firm can 
manufacture the product in question at lower cost than any competitor and so is 
able to determine the output and control price. Third, externalities - which are 
costs or benefits brought upon goods or services that affect the inadvertent 
consumer – may cause market distortions. Externalities may either be negative or 
positive and they tend to affect consumers differently and as such their costs or 
effects are notoriously difficult to access or control. And finally, information 
asymmetry exists where a party to a transaction, usually the buyer, possesses 
significantly less information about the product than the producer or seller or a 
situation where information even where available, is of such technical nature that 
the buyer or consumer is incapable of taking maximum advantage of its 
existence. The result is that the market suffers a social surplus loss.75  
Market failures tend to muddy the economic waters of economies and attempts 
by governments or the authorities to tackle instances of market failure are 




usually via economic regulation. According to Barton, discourses on economic 
regulation characteristically approach the subject from three perspectives. The 
first is regulation as actions the state takes.  Some writers (prominent among who 
are Hans Kelsen and James W. Harris) lay significance on the state as the 
initiator and implementer of regulation. The state’s legitimacy is evidenced in 
the capacity to promulgate and enforce regulation.76 There is little agreement 
among scholars of this persuasion as to the motivation behind the choice of 
regulation or the criteria to determine efficiency as these depend on the 
explanatory model adopted towards the concept of statehood. If the state is 
considered a system of laws and associated norms77, then all other considerations 
such as morality, ethics, and sentiment should be kept separate from the law 
which itself must emanate from, and cater to purely essential needs of the masses. 
Regulation, which must emanate from the legislature after rigorous debate, is 
therefore subsumed into the static body of existing laws to perpetuate the state 
and its existence. The principal consideration is the masses. On another hand, if 
the state is considered a non-social directing intelligence, then the state is the 
embodiment of right; the foundation of the expression of humanity. The state 
acts (makes regulation) as the ultimate consummation of the right the individuals 
and for its own survival. 78  In the voluntary contractual association view of 
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Hobbes and Locke 79 , the state emerges and produces a government as a 
protective hedge for the benefit of the state. The voluntary association is entered 
into for the preservation of the state. All regulation is made to ensure the 
collective survives. These are a few of the notions of statehood that determine 
the criteria for the efficacy of regulation. 
Barton’s second perspective approaches economic regulation as a struggle for 
control within a state. This is an offshoot of the above and demonstrates a 
reaction of specific groups to the authority the statists defend. Hence, the 
subjects of the regulation either are influenced by or rely on factors outside of the 
direct control or legitimacy enjoyed by the regulatory group and its agencies to 
fight the resulting regulation. This struggle to exert or influence regulation 
ensures a richer and more complex context for these group theorists. The final is 
regulation as actions by individuals in promotion of their self-interests. The 
principal concern of studies in this category is the motivation for the creation of 
regulation and the possibility of perverse, self-beneficial compliance. The focus 
here is not simply on the subjects as policymakers may embark on politicised 
regulation, accept unsatisfactory implementation, or be subject to capture.80  
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Posner delineates economic regulation theorization into two schools; public 
interest and capture theories.81 The public interest theory subsumes Barton’s first 
approach and the earliest proponent of the public interest theory, the welfare 
economist Pigou, views regulation as a means of promoting the interest of 
society.82 This approach argues that regulation is a solution to imperfections in 
markets, which are otherwise known as market failures. The line of thinking is 
that if regulation fixes market failures, then this promotes the welfare of the 
community and is in the public’s interest.83 The second arm of Posner’s division 
covers the second and third approaches of Barton’s. On the other hand, Stigler 
holds that ‘...as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit.’84 Stigler argues that administrative failures 
ensure that groups with special interests in the subject of the regulation 
compromise the regulatory process and the resulting regulation.  
The basis of economic regulation is the orderly direction of dominating, complex, 
and sophisticated organisations responsible for a large range of social tasks and 
often endowed with incredibly diverse interests. 85  The crucial roles these 
organizations play and the impact of their existence and actions are so significant 
that their subjection to control is inevitable. These organisations exist, function, 
and conform to rules exercised by an authority which itself is exercised or 
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legitimised by an intangible but popular agreement. Thus, economic regulation is 
a product of state action that seeks to ensure risky behaviour is curtailed and the 
system for which regulation was enacted survives.86  
Economic regulation presupposes the regulation of whole economies, while 
financial regulation brings it down to the regulation of the sector of an economy 
that may be described at the heart of it all. In general, the theories of regulation 
that apply to economic regulation, apply just as much to financial regulation and 
whichever doctrines relied upon for an economic regulatory regime, will 
invariably determine the financial regulatory regime. Having established that 
some sort of regulation or control is required to establish and maintain order in 
any society87, one must determine what the inverse must be in the financial 
sector, especially in light of the importance and fundamentality of the financial 
sector of any economy. It must be pointed out that in this context, the inverse 
situation contemplated is the imposition of regulatory restrictions from an 
external entity to the subject of regulation. This is because virtually every sector 
of an economy is capable of sustaining itself by self-imposed rules and practices 
(whether written or otherwise). In reality, no society is without regulation.88 The 
question that requires answer is whether and what the financial sector benefits 
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from regulation. In other words, why is it necessary to have institutional 
financial regulation in place? There is argument that the financial space, 
especially banking, may benefit from self-regulation. The creatively worded 
argument is reproduced in its entirety;  
The argument for financial laissez-faire (or free banking) is essentially 
very simple: if free trade is generally desirable, then what is wrong with 
free trade in the financial services sector? If nothing is wrong with it, the 
whole panoply of government intervention into the financial sector - the 
central bank, government-sponsored deposit insurance and government 
regulation of the financial system - should presumably all be abolished.89 
Indeed, free markets benefit from strong internal infrastructure and self-
regulation to keep costs down and achieve efficiency.90 Inflicting the seeming 
menace of regulation upon an otherwise unhindered financial market has the 
added disadvantage of weakening both the innate incentive of market 
participants to exercise caution and control in their activities and clients’ or 
customers’ inclination to be diligent in their dealings with the owners. The 
existence of regulation creates a measure of complacency as market participants, 
depending on the sense of security a regulated environment may provide, may 
fall into laziness or indulge their greed and the result may be that financially 
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destructive habits are formed.91 Nevertheless, the regulation of financial services 
reoccurs and remains important and this is because the various financial crises 
over the last few decades have created in the public, and researchers in the area 
as well, an apprehension evidenced in the outcry for ‘better control’ after each 
episode of financial crises. Also, there is the much parroted need to ensure that 
monopolies do not develop.92 The former reason has led to the introduction of an 
avalanche of regulations targeted at whichever financial activity or intermediary 
is blamed for the instant case. The public pressure push for regulatory response 
to crises aside, the usual formal justification for regulatory intervention in 
financial activities of the public sector are that; the exercise of monopolistic 
control of any area of finance actually violates basic conditions for Pareto 
optimality and may potentially lead to inefficiency in the market, the balance of 
relationship between market participants (owners and clients) tilts unfairly in 
favour of the sophisticated owners as against the less informed clients who 
deserve protection from the potential exploitation this asymmetry may afford, 
and the social costs of crises to an economic system are such that systemic 
stability is a priority and must be maintained or restored.93 
For purposes of analysing the efficacy of an international instance of financial 
regulation i.e. Basel III, this research must highlight and analyse the unique 
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considerations that drive international financial regulation. International financial 
regulation describes the normative, interventional rule-making and standard-
setting activities by an international organisation seeking to influence 
macroeconomic and microeconomic activities of a state.94 The typical aims of 
these regulatory activities include minimizing the likelihood of the international 
transfer of risks in economic activities and the promotion of growth through 
financial development.95 It also falls within the ambit of international financial 
regulation to attempt to minimize such inherent risks in business as insolvency 
risk, market risk, and systemic risk. The underlying reason for the check on these 
risks is to insulate, as much as possible, the associated social costs of contagion 
transfer through the failure of a financial intermediary.96  
The financial crisis of 2007 has prompted the priotization of international 
prudential financial regulation as a top item on the list of global public policy 
concerns. Now more than ever, scholars, as well as policy makers, grapple with 
‘the political dynamics associated with this aspect of global economic 
policymaking.’97 The history of any attempt at international financial regulation 
dates back to about 1944 when the leadership of the allied powers, i.e. United 
States and the United Kingdom, agreed on a design for the redevelopment and 
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rebuilding of the various economies of the world that were destroyed by actual or 
seeming warfare in the preceding three decades. This design became the Bretton 
Woods international economic system which became the primal instance of 
international cooperation and institutional trade liberalization.  The Bretton 
Woods system contemplated the creation of both the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), as well as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and proposed fixed exchange rates in a bid to achieve economic 
stability which was considered a foundation for political stability.98 
Around the same period – the end of World War II - international finance picked 
up in the form of the Bretton Woods fuelled Euromarkets. However, there was 
no parallel international attempt to regulate the emerging global financial system. 
The regulation was left to domestic law.99 Attention was drawn in the 1970s to 
the importance of the emerging global financial system and the need for its 
regulation when considerable cross-border risks were revealed by the 
interdependence between domestic financial intermediaries and systems 
evidenced by the collapse of Germany’s Bankhaus Herstatt and other financial 
institutions in that decade. As a direct result of these financial calamities and 
their far-reaching global-markets-upsetting aftermath, concrete attempts were 
made at regulation, or in the very least, introduction of common standards or a 
central database or information hub. This meant the creation or establishment of 
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the BCBS, the Committee on the Global Financial System (created in 1971), the 
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (initially set up in 1980 as a 
Group of Experts on Payment Systems and having gone through a series of 
changes of name and broadening of functions and scope) by the Bank of 
International Settlements. Almost exclusively, international financial regulation 
has developed alongside internationally significant financial devastation. The 
new and increasing wave of crises that would grow to have international effects 
developed on the back of the internationalization of finance and its services. 
These crises include global stock market collapses,100 and financial crises in East 
Asia, Europe, Russia, Argentina, and Mexico. International cooperation towards 
common standards or practices to prevent repetitions of these events spawned the 
creation of an ever-growing number of international financial organisations 
which enjoy varying authority to develop, implement, or monitor implementation 
of standards and policies.101 
 
1.6 Financial Crises 
The only certain aspect of financial crises is that their occurrence has been 
regular in the history of civilization. The number of theories, explanations, and 
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hypotheses that exist about the origin, cause, and progression of financial crises 
attest to the difficulty in expounding a categorical, all-encompassing theory of 
financial crises. Despite this seeming uncertainty, the explanation following each 
episode or instance of crisis falls under any of a series of heads and these are 
institutional weaknesses in a system, unfortunate macroeconomic developments, 
poor risk management and abuse of leverage, failure of management, 
behavioural factors, and an ill-managed shift to liquidity.102 This list is neither 
exhaustive nor are the heads mutually exclusive in the explanation of any 
instance of crisis. Further to the uncertainty of the nature of financial crisis, is 
that the above-mentioned heads do not always cover or address the actual 
origination of the crisis even where it is easy to identify the supervening factor 
that provided the climate for the particular instance. Furthermore, the mode of 
transmission or spread of crises from a sector of an economy to another or others 
is just as unsettled as when the manifestation of crises shifts from an identifiable 
manner to another.103 In spite of this uncertainty, an examination of the types or 
manifestation, as well as the better-known theories of financial crises has 
practical advantages. First, financial crises, in one form or another tend to occur 
and reoccur. An understanding of the dynamics of each instance helps to identify 
catalysts and this in turn aids measures aimed at prevention. Also, in the event 
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that another financial crisis occurs, an understanding of the subject of financial 
crises will aid combative or containment steps as well as lighten the 
responsibility to justify policy or regulatory adjustments.  
A financial crisis is essentially a sudden crash or halt in a financial system. The 
suddenness of the disruption is such that it impairs the functionality of the 
system. A financial crisis usually takes the form of a significant fall in asset 
value coupled with a sharp depletion of funds in the system and often, a bank run 
ensues.104 A uniform definition of financial crises is of limited utility because 
each incident has its own causes or catalysts and possesses case-dependent 
attributes in the way it unravels. Perhaps the most that may be gotten from the 
definition above is the primary feature of a financial crisis which is the 
disruption to the system.  
Financial crises take various forms. A common classification however is made 
based on the method of defining the episode in question. This classification 
divides the manifestation of financial crises into two distinct types; those crises 
that can be defined by quantitative data and terminology and those other that 
may only be described via qualitative and judgmental analysis. While the former 
classification covers currency and sudden stop crises, the latter are mainly debt 
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and banking crises.105 Currency crises occur when the currency of a country 
suffers a sharp depreciation. This specific type of crisis may be caused by 
speculation or such other factors as political or economic uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the depreciation may be as voluntary i.e. because of regulatory 
action (e.g. increase in interest rates or imposition of foreign exchange 
restrictions). In cases such as this, the depreciation is essentially a purposeful 
devaluation that spirals out of hand. On the other hand, a sudden stop crisis 
occurs either when the aggregate capital flows to a country drops suddenly or 
when the country registers a significant fall in international capital inflow. 106 A 
debt crisis entails a sovereign authority being unable or refusing to meet its debt 
obligations. This default may be on either a domestic or a foreign debt. In the 
domestic instance, the country fails or refuse to honour its fiscal obligations.107 A 
banking crisis on the other hand, manifests in actual or potential bank runs 
arising out of a loss of confidence in the banking system precipitated by an 
actual or anticipated financial calamity. The significance of this mode of 
financial crises is apparent in the crucial role banks play in any economy and 
exacerbated by the fact that the cause or catalyst of the crisis need not emanate 
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from the banking sector, a particular bank, or even be banking related for bank 
runs to occur.108  
As noted above, financial crises are difficult phenomena to theorise on. This fact 
has not stopped economists and other writers from attempting to either propound 
theories for soundness of economies or at the very least attempt to theorise based 
on the occurrence of financial crises. Scholarship on these subjects goes as far 
back as the earliest records of significant economic calamity. 109 Theories of 
financial crises fall into schools of thought that argue either a self-regulating 
market or inherent instability model. Both sides of this divide provide fascinating 
analyses that tend towards the inherent theory or monetarism.110  
The stability school of thought comprises a collection of writers and economists 
who hold that markets are inherently stable i.e. capable of rational self-
governance and the occurrence of crises is an abnormality that disappears 
naturally. This principle is traceable to the ‘invisible hand’ mentioned by 
Scottish thinker Adam Smith in his book, Wealth of Nations that was published 
in 1776. 111  Smith argues that acting on their own self-serving instincts and 
desires; economic actors (nations) balance one another out and naturally bring 
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the equilibrium to the markets that no external force or factor may. The 
principles therein caught on and became the basis for much economic theory and 
policies for a considerable length of time. 112  Many notable economists and 
writers of the period built on Smith’s position and either expounded his views or 
used them as a plinth for theirs. Prominent among them is Ricardo who is widely 
considered the father of comparative advantage. Drawing inspiration from Smith, 
he advocated a system in which countries would focus on goods or products in 
which they had comparative advantage to avoid clashes or shortages that may 
destabilise the economy and advocated free trade to ensure the effective 
distribution of goods thus produced. 113   Marshall on his part was very 
instrumental in expanding the works of both Smith and Ricardo. In extending 
their thoughts, he placed emphasis - and was the first to emphasize – on the 
phenomena of demand and supply in the study of economic choices and 
participation. 114  Numerous other writers built on these basic premises and 
expounded offshoot theories of this school of economic thought up to the 
culmination of its most important expression – the efficient market hypothesis.115  
Fama, who is widely considered the father of the efficient market hypothesis, 
divides market efficiency into forms and argues that since in the highest form 
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(strong efficiency) the sum of the inputs reflected in prices would defy even a 
market participant with insider information, markets are unsearchable. A second 
arm of his thinking is the vexed and much debated view that one cannot 
discountenance the notion of an efficient market without discountenancing the 
existence of an equilibrium price. Hence, to hold that there is an optimal price for 
any asset is to hold that markets are capable of rational self-governance.116 The 
thrust of the hypothesis is that asset prices reflect the equal collective knowledge 
of market participants and as such do not require external influence and also that 
as a result of the wisdom reflected in asset prices, markets are naturally at an 
equilibrium and able to self-correct anomalies.117 Accordingly, it is impossible to 
conceive of a situation where an internal force or occurrence destabilises the 
market and even in the off chance of such an occurrence, no external interference 
would be required to restore equilibrium since the market is self-correcting. 
Proponents believe that, crises are nothing but ‘freak events: highly improbable, 
extremely unusual, largely unpredictable and fleeting in their consequences.’118 
Critics however argue that certain repetitive market patterns in the returns of a 
security are inexplicable. The reasoning is that the fact that there is a traceable 
pattern, which repeats itself, means market participants may align themselves 
with this pattern and profit and this is a negation of the conclusions of the 
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hypothesis. 119  Some of these patterns or anomalies (as they are referred to) 
include the ‘size effect’ i.e. stocks of small-capitalization companies  
consistently outperform their larger counterparts over the course of a year120, 
such calendar effects as holiday and weekend gaps121, and the reliability of price-
earnings ratios in forecasting expected returns.122  
Other critics rely on behavioural tendencies to challenge Fama’s findings. The 
premise of the efficient market hypothesis that all market participants are rational 
is itself irrational. The research proves that investment decisions of investors - 
both retail and institutional - tend to depend heavily by their characteristic 
idiosyncrasies. 123   Instances include the tendency to accept a smaller profit 
earlier rather than hold out for a significantly larger profit later in future124, regret 
avoidance125, the tendency to overreact to new information introduced into the 
market126, loss aversion127, herding128, and overconfidence129. Keen argues that 
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the proponents of an efficient market fail to recognise processes that have a lag 
in their occurrence but instead believe that every action of market actors occurs 
in equilibrium. For such a model to work, the inherent processes of the market 
must be stable and this is virtually impossible. The conclusion is that there are 
flaws inherent in that model that would eventually lead to crisis.130 
Friedrich August von Hayek vigorously challenged the premises and tenets of 
socialism; claiming the underlying theory was illogical and incorrect. Arguing 
further, he goes on to state that civilization is a product of such independent and 
creative effort as the acquisition and accumulation of personal property, trade, 
and expansion and this led to the so called extended order. The view here is the 
socialist tenet that only purposeful design may sustain human economic 
endeavour is defective and equilibrium may only be found in non-interference. 
He stresses that since the need for continuity in the non-purposeful order is based 
on non-interference, interference would only serve to cause disruptions. He 
stresses that price signals were the only reliable means of communicating 
specialized, tacit knowledge from each decision maker to another or others.131 
Crisis, therefore, is the result of disruptions in the economy caused by 
interference. There seems to be instances where state interference is inevitable. 
The most prominent instance is the provision of public goods. Even Hayek 
tacitly acknowledged this inevitability of state input in acknowledging that ‘in no 
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system that could be rationally defended would the state just do nothing’. These 
instances where state input is inevitable include provision of social security and 
infrastructural safety net, performance of task free markets were incapable of, 
ensuring equity by regulating legal production, preservation of competition, 
regulation of the environment (negative externalities), and preventing fraud.132 
The instability school of thought, on the other hand, subscribes to a model that 
argues an inherent propensity of an economy to disruptions of varying magnitude 
i.e. correct itself by way of crisis. One of the earliest describers of crises as 
“busts” that follow “booms” was John Stuart Mill. Mill, who was a subscriber of 
the free market paradigm, attempted in his book, Principles of Political Economy, 
to explain the financial upheavals commonplace in his time. According to him, 
bubbles develop by unforeseen incidents that lead to wanton speculation. The 
speculation blossoms on unreasonable expectations of gains and the frenzied 
enthusiasm of numerous imitators. He goes on to hypothesize, in frightening 
accuracy, that ‘a great extension of credit takes place [and] not only do all whom 
contagion reaches employ their credit much more fully than usual; but they seem 
to be making unusual gains and because it generally reckless and adventurous 
feeling prevails, which disposes people to give as well as the credit more likely 
than at any other times, and give it to persons not entitled to it.’ This bubble 
busts when a handful of firms underperform and unreasonable pessimism grips 
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speculators. Prices fall and the effects spill over into the real economy leading to 
‘a condition of more or less impoverishment.’133 
The boom - bust cycle held sway in economics cycles but no significant addition 
was made to its tenets until Marxism arose with the publication of The 
Communist Manifesto.  Marxists view crises as inherent in capitalism and a flaw 
that would spell its eventual demise. Marx had propounded the theories that 
society is embroiled in a seeming class struggle between the “haves” (Bourgeois) 
and the “have nots” (Proletarians). He argues that society has always favoured 
the minority haves, who being the owners of the means of production oppressed 
the disadvantaged majority. Mechanisation as a cost-cutting device has resulted 
in overproduction and underemployment and crises are a demonstration of 
rebellion of the people.134 The centre of Marxist thinking is that capitalism goes 
beyond an economic system to attain an all-consuming political thought pattern 
whose reach affects every aspect of the life of the people. As such, not only does 
crisis manifest the ills of capitalism, it also represents a form of struggle; a 
struggle of the masses not so much against the bourgeois class as against a 
philosophy. Marx’s views have attained considerable longevity with so-called 
Marxists springing up from their seeming passivity each time a crisis occurs – as 
has been the case with the academic scene post 2007.135 
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Schumpeter, while agreeing with Marx’s prediction that capitalism would 
eventually collapse and be replaced by socialism, differed in the exact manner 
the collapse would come about. Classical Economics functions like waves; the 
crest of which were prosperous times and the trough, times of financial distress. 
Believing that capitalism would naturally weaken and eventually implode, 
Schumpeter used the now immensely popular term, creative destruction, to 
describe the natural propensity of capitalism to implode due to its inherent 
disadvantages. A noteworthy element in this argument is the intellectual 
activistic prophesy that this implosion would be brought about by intellectuals 
who would then go ahead to defend the interests of the masses. Another 
noteworthy element is the seeming natural selective tendency of the so-called 
‘creative destruction’ where only some entities will survive the uncomfortable 
fallout of collapse of capitalism.136 Criticisms of this position include the fact 
that crises tend to be caused by factors divorced from activism by the 
intelligentsia. Schumpeter’s views are not very popular and are all but forgotten 
in discussions on financial crises.137 
The 1929 stock market crash in the United States and the worldwide depression 
that ensued created fodder for economists to theorize on crises. Fisher drew 
inspiration from this to develop a theory of economic crisis he christened debt 
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deflation. The theory argues that over-indebtedness and deflation are the causes 
of any crisis. He argues that the bursting of credit bubbles was the cause of that 
crisis and led to crucial negative effects in the real economy. According to him, 
the real issues were ‘over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon 
after; that where any of the other factors do become conspicuous, they are often 
merely effects of symptoms of these two.’  The combination of an unchecked 
growth of debt and the deflation that over-indebtedness brings are the negative 
effects. He lists these as a drop in output, which would cause unemployment, a 
drop in profits and asset prices, hoarding of cash as businesses go bankrupt, a 
loss of investor and consumer confidence, interest rates drop, a contraction of 
money supply as a result of payments of bank loans, and distress selling.138 
Fisher’s views have suffered criticism for the limited scope of his reference in 
formulating his theory. Fisher relied on only three, albeit devastating, crises to 
arrive at his conclusions. Furthermore, not all global crises occurred after a 
deflation as Fisher claimed. His strict view that an accelerated growth of debt 
coupled with deflation though correct for the crisis still devastating the world 
when he formulated his theory does is now of rather little significance for its 
shortcomings.139 
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Perhaps the most important theoretical movement on crises that resulted from the 
crash of 1929 is Keynesianism. Keynesianism arose from the fallout of the1929 
crash and gained a lot of traction in the two decades following the publication of 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. For Keynes, aggregate 
demand is more important than the price of labour in the determination of the 
level of employment. Thus, if demand falls, investors would be less enthusiastic 
about investing leading to the closure of businesses. As wages freeze up or 
disappear, consumers would spend as little as possible and attempt to save more 
resulting in a “paradox of thrift”. His position is that competitive markets will 
not deliver full employment. He claims underemployment is bound to ensue if 
governmental action is not taken. His central argument is that the “uncertainty” 
inherent in an unplanned economy would not make for an equilibrium state. 
Instead, the potential for untrammelled speculation was a real threat.140 Keynes’ 
views held considerable sway and were influential in government policy up until 
the 1970s.141 Keynesian economics enjoyed resurgence in the wake of the 2007 
global financial crisis especially with regard to monetary policy and fiscal 
stimulus.  
Minsky wondered if considering proponents of the inherent stability school 
argue that the markets are self-correcting, there was the possibility of another 
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crisis of the scale of the crash of 1929. His conclusion was that there was the 
need for an economic theory that factored crises into itself as a possibility i.e. an 
inherently unstable system. 142  Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis has 
provided the framework upon which other proponents of an inherently unstable 
system have lain their argument. Notable among them is Kindleberger. By 
analysing numerous historical instances of crises against the Minsky Model, we 
are provided with the five stages of a financial crisis i.e. displacement, monetary 
expansion, overtrading, revulsion, and discredit. In the displacement stage, an 
optimistic economic atmosphere encourages investors to speculate more as there 
is the apparent assurance of profit. In the second stage, the optimism infects 
banking and other financial institutions who lend more and more resulting in an 
expansion of credit. The overtrading stage is where the availability of easy credit, 
coupled with the general euphoria of the favourable economic atmosphere, fuels 
speculators to borrow and invest more. The revulsion and discredit stages linked. 
Price reaches an optimum and a reversal begins. Fear and uneasiness creep in 
and cause an over cautiousness that spells illiquidity. Firms begin to fail as panic 
assumes a firm grip on market participants and it all declines into a full crisis.143 
The advent of the financial crisis in 2007 prompted vociferous criticism of the 
self-stabilizing school of thought.144 It is argued here that there is no better 
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expression of instability is an inescapable flaw of capitalism than Hyman 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis especially in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. A lifelong admirer of Keynes, Minsky based most of his views 
on the macroeconomics of Keynes145. As Minsky’s theory posits, the availability 
of cheap credit and the high optimism tend to shift investors risk appetite from 
the secure edge of the investment options spectrum to the polar opposite where 
the unusually high yield investment vehicles exist. In the instant case, it was the 
optimism fuelled by innovative financial engineering birthing instantly popular 
but complex securitization of various assets especially subprime mortgages. In 
doing this, these investors relied heavily on short term debt financing and 
depended on credit default swaps as risk diversification measures. In addition, 
credit rating agencies where appropriating inaccurate and sometimes dubious 
analyses to the dependability of these assets. The result turned out to be the crash 
in the market that grew into a global crisis. 146 The crisis, to a large extend, 
demonstrates that crises tend to reflect the bust of the boom bust circle.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The principal basis for the existence of law is the establishment and maintenance 
of order in any collective. Regulation, especially of the economic genre, is 
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primarily deployed in institutional aid of efficiency in light of the existence of 
market failures. 147  With or without regulatory effort, times of financial or 
economic chaos characterised by drops in asset value, shortage of liquidity, and 
panicked withdrawals of funds from financial institutions occur. These crises are 
generally thought to occur as a result either as an in-built tendency in economies 
to crash as a corrective measure after a period of excesses or representing 
nothing more than the effect of interference in an otherwise self-regulating 
economy.148 Studies on historical instances of similar crises to the recent global 
financial crisis conclude that most financial crisis develop on the backs of 
bubbles built on wanton speculation fuelled by porous regulation and tend to 
exhibit inbuilt tendencies.149  
To appreciate the role of law in financial crises, one must first appreciate the role 
of law in financial development and stability. There have been advances in 
financial development over the last two decades and the reason lies in changes in 
finance which have been encouraged, to a large extent, by internationalization 
and integration, as well as advances in information technology. Law, legal 
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systems, legal institutions and regulatory systems lie at the heart of these 
advances. The financial development the world has known is not without its 
shortfalls with crises being the most drastic and important.  It has become much 
easier for weaknesses or disruptions in a particular financial system or economy 
to impact other financial systems or economies around the world in light of the 
interlinkage of processes and systems both domestically and globally. So while 
legal structures aid financial development, they also facilitate the likelihood of 
the transmission of contagion in financial markets and economies.150 A principal 
mode of transmission of contagion from one economy to another or others is a 
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND ITS REGULATION 
2.1 Introduction  
International Banking has become an integral part of modern society. 
Remarkable innovation in financial services, the globalization of banking 
services, and outstanding technological advancements have brought with them 
benefits and challenges both for international banking and the global financial 
system. The present state of international banking is a remarkable leap from its 
origins.  The systemic importance of banking in itself and the risk of transfer of 
contagion through banking services make the regulation of international banking 
an important factor in the quest for global financial stability. The build up to 
Basel III must trace the origins of international banking, its systemic importance 
in the global financial system, the events that have driven its growth, the stimuli 
for regulatory efforts, regulation attempts, and the hindrances that have been 
encountered. 
This chapter develops the history of international banking from the inception of 
banking from around 1000 BC to the systemically important phenomenon it has 
become. Further, the chapter examines the efforts towards its regulatory and the 




2.2 Banking at International Scale 
The modern bank is an institution that carries out the functions of banking.151 
These functions include acceptance of funds – in the form of deposits - and other 
valuables for safekeeping, extension of credit, transmission of funds, the creation 
of money in specific circumstances, the creation of a conduit between savers and 
investors, and the facilitation of the transfer of information in the financial 
sector.152 The discovery of the necessity of these functions lies in trade.153 Trade 
itself arose out of the necessity of accessing goods or services required but not 
available or within the competence of the party who needs them. Thus, basic 
needs grew into the wise decisions to store for future consumption and the 
storage of wealth. These needs naturally involved trade with counterparts who 
may be a considerable distance away and from this characteristic arose issues of 
security and convenience.154 Soon the demand for these services conducive to 
trade created a natural supply and involvement and specialization in their 
provision arose.  According to Christophers, this led not only to ingenuity in the 
services provided e.g. the development of money and credit, but also an avenue 
of wealth creation and further developments in banking services.155  
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The development of international banking moved from the development of 
rudimentary banking activities and commercial practices of the Greeks and 
Phoenicians around 1000 BC all the way to rise and fall of the Roman Empire, 
the emergence of the Byzantine Empire, and to the subsequent Arab 
conquests. 156  At about the twelfth century, the Roman Catholic Church had 
begun to lose the sway it enjoyed in both everyday life and banking activities 
(through the activities of the religious order of the Knights of the Holy Temple 
of Jerusalem [Knights Templar]) 157 and this renaissance saw the emergence, 
dominance, and fall of Italian, German, Dutch, and British banking families (also 
called houses) respectively. Each of the dominating houses would establish 
branches (usually by placing a family member to stir its affairs) in the leading 
financial centres in Europe and utilizing communication networks to coordinate 
the affairs of the family.158  
The growth of modern international banks began and took shape around the two 
World Wars. 159 The havoc wreaked by the First World War created a need for 
funds for reconstruction and these funds were eagerly provided by a consortium 
of American banks – led by J. P. Morgan and Company - who, together with 
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other investors, saw new opportunities to speculate on securities on the loans 
made out. The activities of these American banks and investors were far reaching 
in their influence of cross border banking and were so significant that they 
contributed to the crash of 1929 and the ensuing great depression. 160  The 
destructive aftermath of the Second World War saw another bout of frenzied 
financial globalization and the growth of the internationalization of banking 
services.161  
The nationalities of the leading international banks have shifted over time but 
their basic structure and services have remained the same; the establishment of 
counterparts, branches, or wholly owned subsidiaries in other countries, and an 
innovative and ever expanding range of services ranging from the traditional to 
more specialised banking and investment services.162Most of the services offered 
by modern international banking converge on granting international - mostly 
syndicated - loans, management of foreign risks, and engaging in foreign 
exchange market activities.163 International banks carry out these functions by 
offering of credit and repurchasing agreements; the issuing of standby letters of 
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credit; the granting of acceptances; and engaging in transactions such as currency 
futures, interest rate options, and currency swaps among others.164 
The entities that operate as international banks presently have emerged and 
thrived as a result of technological advancements and the liberalization financial 
markets have enjoyed in the last few decades.165 Improvements in information 
and communications technology have caused a significant reduction of costs in 
associated with the generation, transmission, and utilization of financial 
information and this has allowed for ease in real-time synchronisation and 
control of affairs overseas. On the other hand, the rise of institutional investors 
and the demand for capital by such parties as the member Republics of the 
former Soviet Union (post its dissolution in 1991) and developing countries set 
on building efficient economies has seen the development of international 
financial markets. This has come with the prudence of liberalisation and further 
growth of international banking. 166 These catalysts pair up with demand for 
financial services by both multinationals and emerging economies to ensure that 
international banks play an important role in economic progress in the future. 
International banks are also important in the global economy for the roles they 
play which are complimentary to those of international financial markets.167 
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2.3 Systemic Importance of International Banking 
The importance of international banking lies just as much in its role as a 
corollary to international trade and financial development or redevelopment, as 
in the risks its failure poses.168  
Banks, whether national, regional, or international, have the unique quality of 
being intertwined in their dealings; banks routinely lend to and borrow from one 
another, maintain deposit balances with one another, and rely on a common 
payment clearing system. This creates an intricate and somewhat delicate 
financial dependency in which the failure of one unit may likely and quickly spill 
over to the next or others and threaten the system. 169 This makes the banking 
system more susceptible to systemic risk and more so is the case of international 
banks or banking and by, extension, the case of the global financial system. 
Systemic risk is not the only risk inherent in international banking; others are 
‘safety and solvency risks, through imprudent lending or trading activity, and … 
risks to depositors, through the lack of adequate bank insurance.’170 However, in 
considering the systemic importance of international banking and its role in 
financial crisis, crucial consideration should be had to the unique position 
international banks occupy in relation to the financial health of the world and no 
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factor exemplifies this importance as much as the systemic risk inherent in its 
activities.    
Systemic risk, simply put, is the likelihood that a defect in a component will 
negatively affect the whole as a result of the interdependence of the components 
that form the whole. Put differently and in a financial context, it is ‘the 
probability that cumulative losses will occur from an event that ignites a series of 
successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a 
system.’171 In the financial sphere, Kupiec and Nickerson have defined it as ‘the 
potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in asset 
prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and 
efficiency losses.’172 This ‘possibility of a series of correlated defaults among 
financial institutions … that occurs over a short period of time, often caused by a 
single major event’173 typically affects banks. The usual mode of transmission is 
the default by bank in the discharge of its obligation to another bank and this 
negatively affects the ability of the second bank to meet its own obligations and 
the default creates a chain reaction which may eventually veer out of the banking 
sector.  
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There is slight disagreement as to the exact meaning of systemic risk. This 
disagreement stems from the focus of individual writers in defining the term. The 
disagreement concerning what exactly systemic risk is, evolves around the 
regulation of banks and their fragility.174 Alan Greenspan sums up the confusion 
by observing that even though it is not in contention that systemic risk portends 
some sort of disruption in a financial system, different observers may come to 
completely different interpretations of the exact cause and effect loop of the 
concept. Hence, the same outcome that may be described as market failure may 
as well be viewed as a natural, wholesome, albeit harsh market outcome.175  
To appreciate the connection between systemic risk and the internationalisation 
of banking services, one must understand the nuances of international expansion 
of banking services. International expansion of the banking services of a 
particular bank will affect its risk profile and stability as a result of risk 
diversification and efficiency gains. 176  As a bank’s operations and services 
transcend its geographical limitations, the specific institution often engages in 
diversification of the riskiness of its overall portfolio and enjoys a reduction of 
riskiness in the process. Research exists that suggests that this benefit tends to 
cause the bank to engage in more risky practices as it enjoys the possibility of 
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reaping higher returns as compared to its exposure.177 Thus, the diversification 
advantage of international expansion also comes with risk of recklessness in 
banking practices. This does not necessarily mean internationalisation of banking 
is a bad idea as the enhanced risk sharing therefrom may ensure that the global 
financial system enjoys financial stability. Claessens has demonstrated that this 
enhanced risk sharing reduces the likelihood of ‘a financial crisis and lead[s] to 
less procyclical lending behaviour.’ 178  De Nicoló et al argue that the risks 
involved in internationalization of banking services may not be significant so far 
as risks are properly accessed by the parent institution.179  
An important operations positive from the cross-border nature of international 
banking is the advantage branches of international banks tend to enjoy by way of 
credit supply support from the parent foreign bank in a financial crisis. The same 
channel serves the double-edged function of also being the conduit for contagion 
into the host economy in times of crisis. 180  To better understand the exact 
contribution to the worsening or alleviation of financial crisis in a financial 
system depends largely on the ability of foreign banks to assess and manage 
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cross-border risks. As the efficiency of cross-border risks management is such an 
important factor in the exposure of any economy that hosts an internationally 
active banking organisation, any failure in the banking in the sector’s role as a 
source of capital to such an economy would deprive the economy of capital and 
cause its cost to increase and thus a classical demonstration of an instance of 
systemic failure. The scarcity and increase in cost of capital ‘the most serious 
direct consequences of a systemic failure.’181 
The primary task of protecting any economy from the consequences of 
mismanaged systemic risk lies in local or domestic regulators. The primary 
objective of regulators in host countries of international banks is the safety of 
their own economy. However, factors such as the level of technological 
advancement, rate of innovation in financial services, and the imprudence of an 
inordinately restrictive economy, tend to create a situation where regulation of 
international banking activities seem beyond the reach of country level 
regulation. Even though domestic regulators in economies beset by the 
inadequacies listed above (or any restrictive regulatory system) will focus 
primarily on measures that ensure insulation from the effects of systemic risk, 
their best efforts will hardly confer immunity from systemic risk as all it takes 
for systemic risk to become real is for a single institution to fail – in this instance, 
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a single bank.182 This creates need for some level of international cooperation 
and coordination of international banking activities.  
 
2.4 Regulation of International Banking 
The importance of banking in any economy accounts for it being the subject of 
greater and more restrictive control than any other sector of the economy.183 The 
failure of a bank is often believed to be more important than the failure of any 
other kind of financial business because it is thought to cause more drastic 
adverse disruptions in the economy.184 According to Jaarsveld, the failure of a 
bank may ‘seriously disrupt the monetary system of a country. Not only does the 
financial loss of depositors negatively affect domestic capital availability, but 
questions are raised internationally about the effectiveness and soundness of 
such a country's fiscal controls.’185 According to Rodriguez, a bank is such a 
financial institution whose soundness and survival is the backbone of the 
soundness of an economy and as such regulatory efforts must cover economic 
soundness, safety, and regard for the protection of consumers.186  
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Banks are strategically important also because of the functions they perform in 
any economy. For instance, it is banks that carry out the function of financial 
intermediation i.e. the acceptance of deposits which is then given out as loans. 
However, since a bank’s liability to depositors is payable on demand while the 
loans which it gives are not, failure or mismatch in the volume of repayment of 
loans and request for deposit may easily trigger a liquidity crisis in the economy. 
Hence banks provide the further service of liquidity insurance and since this 
intermediation service puts them in a position to gather important information on 
the health of an economy (by gauging the rates of saving and borrowing), banks 
are in prime position to conduct ongoing monitoring and production of this 
information.187 International banks are essentially banks and the importance of 
the national bank is multiplied in an international bank. Hence, if the role and 
importance of domestic banking to an economy are projected to international 
banking and the global economy, it becomes apparent that the state of health of 
the global financial system may easily be gauged from the analytics of 
international banking.  
Earlier in this chapter, it was demonstrated how international banking emerged 
and developed alongside international trade and development. Interestingly 
however, and in spite of the important role international banks came to play in 
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the global financial system, attempts at regulation and harmonisation of their 
operations only left the sphere of domestic law late in the twentieth century.188  
An implication of the internationalisation of banking, and indeed any other 
industry, is that the elements that affect (and should affect) its regulation are 
difficult to adequately enumerate. This is because there is an almost endless and 
complicated comparison, contradistinction, and juxtaposition of the will and 
policies at the domestic and international levels.189 The reconciliation of the 
consideration at these levels involves harmonizing the likelihood of divergent 
objectives and amount of importance attached to specific aspects of each 
objective. 190  In spite of this tense and difficult balance, the need for this 
reconciliation is ever present as globalisation continues and mutual 
accommodation is necessary. This difficult balance somewhat explains the delay 
in the initiation of international attempts to regulate internationally active banks. 
Banking regulation, for what it is today (both domestic and international), was 
the exclusive preserve of domestic law until well into the mid-80s. The task of 
balancing regulatory objectives, priorities, and interests among international 
banks, the local economy and regulators, and the international community lay in 
laps of central banks. 191  It took the collapse of West Germany’s Bankhaus 
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Herstatt in 1974 for efforts to harmonise international banking to kick off.192  
Prior to the Herstatt collapse, central banks held sway.  
In the absence of formal arrangements for international banking institutions, their 
regulation was subject to the usual prudential regulation and banking supervision 
of central banks. According to Polizatto, ‘prudential regulation is the codification 
of public policy toward banks, banking supervision is the government's means of 
ensuring compliance.’ 193  The specific tasks that central banks fulfil for this 
functions may be grouped into three; investor protection, micro-prudential 
supervision, and macro-prudential scrutiny. Under the investment protection 
head, central banks focus on the formulation and introduction of rules regarding 
the conduct of banking business and the management and disclosure of 
information. Individual banks are subjected to on and off-site surveillance and 
control to ensure the protection of depositors’ funds under the micro-prudential 
head. And finally, macro-prudential scrutiny involves ongoing monitoring of 
banks’ exposure to systemic risk as well as the vigilance for threats arising from 
market developments and infrastructures. 194  These are basic central bank 
functions alongside those of lender-of-last-resort and reserve holding which 
justify its existence. 195  Most of the roles central banks played prior to the 
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introduction of international standards are still intact and are still played by them 
till this day. 
The earliest attempt to coordinate international banking regulation was made by 
the BIS and was in response to the Herstatt calamity of 1974. The BIS, 
composing central banks of G-10 countries and central banks of about 28 other 
countries and the central banks of Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa and 22 
other countries created the BCBS.196  The activities of the BIS and its agencies 
are not binding under international but command persuasive authority for the 
patronage they enjoy.197 In 1974 the BCBS was formed and given a mandate to 
supervise international banking and in 1975 the committee issued the Basel 
Concordat.198 The concordat first recommendation was to subject all foreign 
banks to supervision and encouraged said supervision to be the joint 
responsibility of authorities both in the host and home countries.199 Other rules 
made thereunder applied to issues of solvency, foreign exchange exposures, and 
liquidity levels.  They were to apply to activities of banks operating in a country 
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other than the mother company whether these activities are channelled through 
branches, joint companies, or subsidiaries. The supervision envisaged still 
allowed central banks sway over the activities of international banks but allowed 
for some supplementary international coordination with regulators (Central 
banks) in the home country.200 
In 1983, the 1975 concordat was replaced. The new concordat set out guidelines 
to improve the efficacy of the supervisory relationship between parent and host 
authorities. This concordat did not address lender of last resort roles of central 
banks but instead sought to establish responsibilities central banks in monitoring 
prudential conduct and soundness aspects of foreign based or owned banks.   
The principles set out in the report are not necessarily embodied in the 
laws of the countries represented on the Committee. Rather they are 
recommended guidelines of best practices in this area, which all members 
have undertaken to work towards implementing, according to the means 
available to them.201 
Interestingly, what may be termed formal coordination is also traceable to the 
collapse collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974. Even though the collapse of 
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Bankhaus Herstatt is the best known and probably most frequently mentioned202 
catalyst for regulatory efforts in that period, steam had already picked up from a 
number of prior and contemporary bank failures in that decade including those of 
Franklin National Bank and the Israeli British Bank (IBB). The Herstatt failure 
evolved around questionable foreign exchange dealings by the bank and poor 
regulatory supervision by the West German authorities. This resulted in huge 
losses on the part of counterpart banks in other countries, hiccups on the 
international payment system, and even the unintended consequence of causing 
the collapse of the Israeli British Bank (IBB) and brought into focus the risks of 
unregulated cross-border banking. 203  These consequences raised serious 
questions, as Mourlon-Druol put it, ‘as to who would regulate and supervise 
what and where’. 204 
The answer proffered by bank governors of G10 countries - under the auspices of 
the BIS – was to create the body that later became known as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee’s primary objective was to 
promote information exchange and ultimate harmonisation of regulations 
through ‘model standards’.205  And thus the BCBS became the standard bearer as 
far as standards for international banks are concerned. However, a variety of 
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other (mostly financial) intuitions, either directly or indirectly, influences the 
direction of international banking functions and practices. These include the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Institute for International Finance, the 
BIS, and the World Bank.206  
The succeeding chapter focuses on the BCBS and the accords it has released. 
 
2.5 Challenges of International Banking Regulation 
International banking, amongst other things, facilitates the movement of vast 
amounts of a variety of currencies at breath-taking speed across borders with 
remarkable ease. Rather unfortunately, the regulatory framework in place 
(principally the accords of the BCBS) is believed to lag while dealing with the 
challenges the ease and volume of these transactions have brought about as well 
as bring uniformity in the regulation of the sector.207 The feats of ease and 
efficiency international banking enables are not unconnected with the 
developments in the sector over the last few years.  The growth of international 
banking, in light of technological strides and advancements in information and 
communication technology, has thrown up new and heretofore unknown 
challenges for regulators. The best exemplification is the rate at which 
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technology driven financial innovation outpaces regulation to curb the excesses 
therefrom. As challenges of are tackled (whenever the opportunity arises) by 
regulators, the further challenge of harmonising regulatory efforts between the 
more industrialised nations of the west with those of the less developed world 
festers.208  
Perhaps the most prominent of the host of challenges not connected with 
technological advancement is that international banking ‘is particularly burdened 
with issues related to the flow of information between financial institutions and 
prudential authorities, as well as among financial institutions themselves.’ These 
issues tend to increase vulnerability of the global financial system. According to 
Turner, an example is of ‘supervisors in central and Eastern Europe 
[complaining] that foreign banks, which are of systemic importance to the region, 
often release insufficient information about their operations.’ 209  This 
secretiveness, whether to bolster their positions or to gain an advantage over 
competitors or regulators, makes for poor data collection on the state of the 
sector and in consequence, inadequate regulation.210  
Another challenge is the seeming, albeit informal, protectionism practiced by 
host countries of international banks. Host countries, rather selfishly but not 
imprudently, attempt to enjoy the advantages of international banking while 
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seeking to avoid contagion. The result is that there is constant selective 
implementation of standards which leads to a lack of harmony in international 
efforts. This sole parasitic goal of indulgent self-preservation, informed by the 
need to maintain soundness and safety of the local economy, determines the 
basis of domestic regulatory policy and efforts.211 Furthermore, there is a notable 
reluctance of the banks and bankers to embrace attempts at international 
regulation.212 Upon the release of Basel III, its biggest antagonists, the banks it 
seeks to regulate, through the Institute of International Finance (IIF) painted 
fearful pictures of doom and gloom concerning the economic cost of the 
accord.213 Credit Suisse, fighting against Basel III complained that the proposed 
Net Stable Funding Ratio alone would require European banks to raise over a 
trillion euros in the long term as would naturally be pressured to curtail reliance 
on short-term funding.214 This argument exemplifies the reluctance of banks to 
accede to regulatory efforts especially as while the argument that additional 
capital would have to be raised held true for a few banks, most others were 
awash with capital and could easily meet said requirements.215  
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2.6 Conclusion  
As deregulation, advances in information technology, and globalisation of 
financial services reduce the world into an ever smaller financial space, 
international banking, which is at the forefront in global finance, is in an ever 
increasing position to have considerable impact.216 The impact includes cross - 
border contagion origination and transmission by banks, scandals in the sector 
involving mismanagement, shocks from macroeconomic policies, a growing and 
fierce competition among international banks etc.  These have created a gentle 
but nagging need for the sector to be protected. 217 Gentle because most domestic 
regulators are focused on their local economies, and nagging because the realities 
point to a system of that is so interdependent that contagion is easily transferred. 
Also, additional risks are now easily created in both the international banking 
sector and indeed the international financial system even though they emanated 
from a local bank.218  
Previously, the regulation of international banking did not have a readily 
identifiable, all-encompassing objective and so the earliest efforts of the BCBS 
depended heavily on the prevailing economic circumstances and were geared 
towards promotion of safer practices, aiding regulators to advance healthy 
                                                          
216 See Mathias Dewatripont, Jean Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks (first published 
1993, MIT Press 1994)  
217 I. L. Van Jaarsveld, ‘Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision -
Defying the Challenges’ (2002)119 SALJ 71 
218 See South African Reserve Bank Banking Supervision Department Annual Report (1998)  
76 
 
investments in the sector, or regaining public confidence in the sector. 219  
Presently however, growth in the intellectual sphere of banking regulator has 
evolved enough to highlight such essential factors of banking regulation as 
investor and stakeholder protection, structural and prudential regulation.220  
It is against this backdrop of the systemic importance of international banking 
and the challenges of international banking regulation that the BCBS’s founding, 
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CHAPTER 3: THE BCBS REGIME AS REGULATORY RESPONSE  
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter traces the path international banking has taken from its 
earliest form all the way to the systematically important phenomenon that has 
garnered enough attention to warrant the setting up of a specific agency for its 
regulation. Just as import as tracing the developments and efforts concerning 
regulating international banking, is the need to analyse the history of the BCBS 
and the accords it has released thus far.  
This chapter builds on the discussions in the preceding chapter to chronicle the 
history and notable aspects of the BCBS’s regime of international banking 
standard-setting. In this chapter, the origins of the committee, as well as, the 
basis of each of the accords it has released is discussed. Also, the build up to the 
introduction of Basel III is developed and the reforms therein are introduced. 
 
3.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: International Banking 
Watchdog 
The Basel regime of international banking standards came into existence as a 
result of the establishment of the BIS. The BIS, which is the parent organisation 
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of the BCBS, traces its establishment to the Young Plan of 1930.221 The bank’s 
principal remit was to foster closer ties and co-operation amongst central banks 
of member countries, facilitation of loans to member states, and to act as 
manager and trustee with regard to international transactions connected with the 
reparations ordered against the German government in respect of the First World 
War. While the BIS is a company limited by shares duly incorporated under 
Swiss Law with its member states as shareholders, it is also an international 
organisation whose activities are beyond Swiss law. In time however, the 
reparation mandate of the BIS ended and the focus of the bank shifted to co-
operation among central banks. In 1974, the Governors of the Central banks of 
the G10 (and Switzerland) established the body now known as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.222  
As noted elsewhere in this work, the BCBS arose out of the collapse of 
internationally significant banks. 2 of these are Bankhaus Herstatt and Franklin 
National Bank. 223  Bankhaus Herstatt was forced to liquidate by German 
regulators when attempts to rescue the bank failed. The bank, partly due to fraud 
in its bookkeeping practices, had been due (but failed) to settle foreign interbank 
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exchange responsibilities to U. S. banks.224 This caused a strain in U.S. payment 
systems and even led to the coinage of the so-called ‘Herstatt risk’ which 
describes the risk of failure to meet interbank payment obligations.225 On the 
other hand, Franklin National Bank had gotten into excessive risky positions on 
currency and in so doing exposed itself to untenable currency rate risks and in 
spite of hefty deposits, found itself unable to meet dividend payments. 
Institutional depositors rushed to recover funds upon finding out of the liquidity 
problems as a result of the huge trading losses sustained. 226 
The fallout was the formation and adoption of the Basel concordat in 1975 with 
the implicit aim of imposing a measure of effectiveness in the supervision of the 
activities of international banks. To this end, the activities and roles of both the 
home regulators of international active banks and those of the host countries of 
branches or subsidiaries were delineated and clarification of information sharing 
on issues such as foreign exchange operations, liquidity, and solvency was 
demanded. In spite of these developments, within the members of G10, the need 
for uniformity in capital standards only became obvious after the occurrence of 
the sovereign debt crisis of 1982.227 
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By 1982 (beginning from 1975), Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were in default 
of vast development loans obtained in the 1960s and 1970s from international 
debtors including commercial banks. Amongst the international creditor banks 
were a number of major U.S. banks. The U.S.A. fearing ‘an era of severe 
financial difficulties’ for both the U.S. banking sector and the economy in the 
event of forfeiture, began clamouring for stricter regulatory capital standards.228 
The only snag in the U.S. agitation was the imprudence of imposing unilateral 
standards as this would ‘jeopardize the competitiveness of U.S. banks in 
international markets’. The solution became to co-opt the British authorities 
(British banks had taken big hits as they were heavily invested in the sovereign 
debts of the aforementioned Latin American countries) into this plan in the hope 
of cajoling other countries such as Germany and Japan, which had considerably 
less exposure to the risks in the event of forfeiture as their banks were not as 
heavily invested and whose banks were also enjoying the competitive advantages 
of having lower capital standard.229 The U.S.A. and the U.K. entered into a 
bilateral agreement to fix minimum capital standards and pushed for further 
negotiations with other countries like Germany and Japan. These so called 
negotiations were backed by not too subtle threats ‘threat that they would restrict 
access to their markets . . . from countries that did not implement the new capital 
adequacy standards’ and that new minimum standards would be applied to any 





bank which intended to operate in the U.S. market. These negotiations led to the 
formulation and adoption of the first Basel Accord.230 
 
3.2.1 Basel I 
Formally the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (simply referred to as Basel I), this document was released in 1988. 
According to Goodhart, the exact provisions of this accord tended to cater mostly 
to capital standards as it was released in response to issues of capital flows 
resulting from the Arab oil crisis and the international debt crisis arising out of 
the collapse of Bankhaus Herstat.231 The Accord provided for minimum capital 
standards for internationally active banks and focused almost entirely on credit 
risk, which was perceived to be the main risk borne by banks. The four- part 
framework included various sections and covered the definition of capital, the 
structure of risk weights, definition of the target standard ratio, and transitional 
implementation arrangements.232 A bank's capital, according to that accord, was 
divided into two tiers; the much safer tier 1 also known as ‘core capital’ and the 
significantly more inferior tier 2 capital also known as ‘supplementary 
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capital’.233 The accord created risk rates (0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%) and 
assigned these to assets of a bank with the understanding that the lower the risk 
rating attained, the more creditworthy the underlying asset was.234 After being 
risk-weighted, these assets determined the amount of capital the bank was 
required to hold.  Basel I recommended that the total amount of the capital held 
by a bank, when divide by the total credit risk, must be equal to or greater than 8% 
and of this figure, 4% would have to be tier 1 capital.235 
Although the Accord may have been designed and directly aimed at only 
internationally active banks in G-10 nations, it was soon adopted by a ‘much 
wider range of banks, regional as well as international, and in non G1O as well 
as G1O countries, though the BCBS put no pressure on non G1O countries to do 
so.’236 Goodhart describes several reasons that might have been the cause for this: 
that Basel addressed an obvious problem, it provided a "short, simple, and 
straightforward" solution to the problem, and peer pressure (among regulators, 
credit ratings agencies, and banks themselves) wound up being stronger than 
originally anticipated. 237 
From the start, critics lampooned this accord. First, and perhaps the most 
important criticism of the BCBS and the accord, were the issues of ‘little or no 
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transparency’ in its creation and lack of external input in the creation process as 
well as the seeming draconian bindingness of the resultant accord.238 Another 
perception was that the accord was simply a reaction to a string of sovereign debt 
defaults and in this regard was an attempt at harmonizing prices across 
internationally competitive banks in a bid to create a level playing field. Ahmed 
and Khalidi while acknowledging the apparent discriminatory assignment of a 
higher risk weight on non-OECD banks than their OECD counterparts239 and the 
adverse impact said measure would have on developing countries, point out that 
the accord was meant to be dynamic.240  Van Roy, relying on data from 6 G-10 
countries, concludes that Basel I was of limited effect in effecting increase in 
bank capital and reducing credit risk outside of the United States of America.  
Furthermore, he attributed the comparative success in the United States to 
market discipline.241  
 
3.2.2 Basel II 
In 2004, the BCBS released the International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, (also known as 
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Basel II). The BCBS, had prior to this, released 3 consultative papers in 1999, 
2001, and 2003 setting out a proposed 3 pillar structure; the determination and 
maintenance of minimum capital requirements; an enhanced supervisory review 
process; and the maintenance and enforcement of higher market discipline.242 
The release of the accord was preceded by several necessitating factors. These 
include the Asian financial crisis of 1998, the regulatory arbitrage and general 
inefficiencies of the earlier accord, and the development of innovative risk 
management systems in international banks.243 The consensus was that Basel I 
had missed the mark in terms of creating a level playing field and this failure was 
partly as a result of the differences in the country conditions and applicable 
accounting standards. 244  It was generally agreed that Basel I had become 
outdated and that in order for the accords to meet their aim of being effective 
risk-management measures, they must evolve with the times.245 
The basis for the introduction of Basel II was the need to improve capital 
adequacy requirements as well as introduce a more holistic approach to 
prudential supervision of international banking. And to do this, the accord 
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introduced a three pillar system. 246 The first pillar covered minimum capital 
requirements; while the second outlines the principles upon which regulator 
supervise international banks; and the third pillar focuses on market discipline by 
stricter disclosures and internal control mechanisms.247  
The most notable reforms include provision for a unitary capital requirement for 
each asset class, generation of a range of values for regulatory capital depending 
on the credit worthiness of the borrower, the ability of a bank to self-access the 
riskiness of assets it holds, and he introduction of  new operational and 
transparency requirements on banks.248 
Basel II had a delayed implementation but managed to attain adoption by 
virtually ‘every country with an internationally active bank’249 with the official 
figures as high as 100 internationally active banks.250 The implementation being 
so tardy created a few talking points for critics. The perception was that the 
largest international banks stood to gain an undue advantage over smaller 
international banks, especially those based in developing nations since the latter 
may not possess the infrastructure to implement the risk assessment the accord 
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demanded and the ability to bear the cost of the compliance.251 Another concern 
with the tardy adoption of the reforms of the accord was that countries were 
intentionally holding back implementation because of a fear that premature 
implementation in countries with limited ability might lead to diversion of 
resources rom more pressing priorities and this would tend to weaken rather than 
strengthen the banking system.252 
Slow implementation saw several countries still implementing aspects of Basel II 
into their domestic regulatory framework as late as 2008.253 This patchy and 
lengthy implementation, which ran well into the onset of the global financial 
crisis, leaves holes in the debate of whether the accord helped to ameliorate the 
crisis254  or indeed worsened it.255   
 
3.3 Build up to Basel III: A New Crisis 
The undisputed reason for Basel III is the global financial crisis that broke out in 
the summer of 2007. The catalyst of the crisis was mortgage practices in the real 
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estate sector in the United States. For a number of years prior to the crisis, a 
housing bubble had developed as a result of the lure to grant mortgages to high 
risk home buyers because of the higher interest this practice attracted.  
Unsurprisingly, these borrowers defaulted on their loans and as the number of 
defaulters grew, Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs) and Credit Default 
Obligations (CDOs) tied to these so called sub-prime mortgages began to fall 
into default. In a domino-effect style progression, hedge funds, and other 
investors (both national and foreign) with interests in investments in these 
mortgage-tied products followed. Soon thereafter, the liquidity squeeze and 
panic hit the retail space resulting in bank runs. The defining moment and the 
true onset of crisis was the collapse or near collapse (only because the 
Government stepped in) of such financial giants as Northern Rock, Bear Sterns, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Fannie and Freddie), Lehman brothers, and 
American International Group (AIG).256 
There is a litany of causes or at least contributing factors to this crisis and these 
fall under a few themes such as human frailty i.e. natural predatory instincts of 
humans, the instincts for mastery, delusions of investors, greed, herd behaviour, 
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adaptive expectations; 257  institutional failures i.e. failure of regulators and 
regulation; 258  and defective macroeconomic policies i.e. the crisis was an 
expression of the failure of unbounded capitalism.259  
An official position, as per the permanent subcommittee on investigations of the 
United States Senate, in its report on the crisis, is that there are four major 
causative factors of the crisis. These are high risk lending, regulatory failure, 
inflated credit rating, and investment bank abuses.260Allen and Carletti attribute 
the outbreak of the crisis to recent history of laxity in monetary policy of the 
United States Federal Reserve combined with an international trade imbalance. 
They posit that the availability of cheap credit and the dependence on excessive 
leverage by banks played a significant role the in the creation of credit bubble.261  
To Shahrokhi, the intricate matrix of the market structures, institution, and 
regulators of the US financial system contributed immensely to the crisis. The 
neoliberal variation of capitalism practiced in the US and such exogenous events 
as the incursive wars into Afghanistan and Iraq directly precipitated failure in the 
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markets i.e. Commodities, sub-prime housing, equities, and credit.262 There is 
also a case for the crisis being blamed on the non-access of the shadow banking 
system to the liquidity of the central bank as the lender-of-last resort.263  
Banks and their regulation also played a part.  Cabral holds that banks had been 
posting astronomical profits in the years prior to the crisis. Profits which came 
about through ‘balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term 
risk mismatches between assets and liabilities.’ These banks continued to 
capitalise on the soft and porous regulatory framework to increase their leverage 
and in the process set the stage for a systemic crisis.264  
For Brunnermeier et al, crisis was a not simply as result of an insufficient reach 
of regulation.265 This is because at the heart of the crisis was highly regulated 
institutions. The problem was in the calibre of existing regulation. Since crises 
associated with banking occur fairly frequently, regulatory reaction should not be 
overly focused on the characteristics of a particular crisis. Hence, the existing 
regulations at the time the crisis occurred failed because they focus more on the 
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particular causes of past crises rather than ‘fundamental market failures that have 
either been ignored or improperly dealt with in our regulation so far.’266   
Another view was that the crisis se reflected macroeconomic issues and 
imbalances in the global economic structure and these issues and imbalances 
originated in the US economy. It is argued here that the influence of the high 
import demand of the U. S. economy on that country’s trade imbalance and the 
fostering of this need by the Chinese Government long-term policy of 
maintaining the undervalued exchange rate of the RMB. The United States 
hunger for imports necessitated budgetary deficits, which was fed by significant 
sales of treasury bills. Asian investors still reeling from the lessons of the Asian 
crisis of 1997 eagerly purchased these rather low yielding bills on the strength of 
the credibility of the U.S. Treasury Department. Additionally, the American 
authorities maintained low interest rates as a result of the losses suffered by 
Americans in the wake of the busting of the dotcom bubble and also as a device 
to maintain confidence in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States 
on the 11th of September of 2001 (9/11). The combination of these factors saw a 
consumer demand boom and an inordinate expenditure on a housing boom. 
These resulted in an ever-deepening debt pit dug with the aid of the availability 
of cheap credit.267 Roubini and Mihm subscribe to a similar, albeit, more caustic 
notion. For them, the crisis was the manifestation of a mixture of fairy tale 
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academic theories (free markets); unbridled greed evidenced in warped 
compensation structures, reckless and endless financial innovation, as well as the 
acts of corrupt ratings agencies over the past half century. They conclude that the 
crisis was ‘less a function of sub-prime mortgages than of a sub-prime financial 
system.’268 
The principal mode of transmission of the crisis was the banking system.269 
Banks were the primary conduit of the crisis as the transmission of the financial 
crunch to other sectors of the economy was mainly via the illiquidity the banks 
suffered in the wake of the crisis.270 Since it was essentially a banking crisis, the 
BCBS stepped up to act. 
The BCBS’s response was Basel III. Remarkably, before Basel III, the BCBS 
announced ‘a comprehensive strategy to address the lessons of the banking crisis’ 
at the tail end of 2008 and soon after announced the still-born ‘enhancements to 
the Basel II Capital framework [popularly known as Basel 2.5].’271 However, 
very soon thereafter, the committee embarked on the consultations that 
culminated in Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking systems and Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk 
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measurement, standards and monitoring – and Basel 2.5 was effectively 
abandoned. 
 
3.4 Basel III 
At the end of 2009, the BCBS released ‘Strengthening the resilience of the 
banking sector’ which proposed ‘to strengthen global capital and liquidity 
regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector.’272 This 
was a consultative document. Following consultations held upon the responses to 
this document, Basel III was released in 2010.273 This document has been revised 
with both Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems in June 2011 to reflect the CVA (Credit Valuation Adjustment) 
modification and Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk 
monitoring tools released in January of 2013 which reflects the revision of the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) respectively.274 
Basel III builds on the three-pillar structure of Basel II. The priority, according to 
the BCBS, remains strengthening ‘the quality, consistency, and transparency of 
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the regulatory capital base.’275 The Basel III version of the three pillar structure 
incudes quality and quantity of capital, risk management and supervision, and 
market discipline. In addition, Basel III introduces global liquidity standards 
with their supervision and monitoring tools.276 
Basel III restricts Instruments which qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital 
substantially, completely does away with the Basel II position of having a 
distinction between an upper and a lower band of Tier 2 capital, eliminates tier 3 
capital altogether.277 Under Basel III, a banks is mandated to hold a higher level 
of stable capital up to a minimum of 8.0% of RWAs at every given time.278 Tier 
1 capital which is the primary capital is considered as the going concern capital 
and consists of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) and Additional Tier 1. CET 1 
Capital is expected to account for at least 4.5% of the RWAs of a bank and 
additional tier 1 should account for the remaining 1.5%. 279  CET 1 capital 
comprises issued shares of the bank which meet specified criteria, retained 
earnings, share premium, an assortment of incomes and disclosed reserves, 
interests held by minorities in the common stock of consolidated subsidiaries, 
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and regulatory adjustments.280 Basel III lists criteria for shares to be classified as 
common equity and these include that the shares shall not rank higher than any 
other claim in the event of the liquidation of a bank, have a perpetual principal, 
be irredeemable and unbound to a cancellation or buy-back, be unencumbered by 
any device that makes the payment of dividend discretionary, have their payment 
classified as equity under the relevant accounting standards etc.281 
Additional Tier 1 capital, on the other hand, is the sum of instruments issued by a 
bank that meet certain criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital, stock 
surplus from the issue of Additional Tier 1 instruments, ‘instruments issued by 
consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that meet the 
criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital’, and certain regulatory 
adjustments. Furthermore, the first and third components must not have been 
included in Common Equity Tier 1.282 There are of 14 criteria for inclusion as 
additional Tier 1 capital and these include the instrument not having a maturity 
date or an incentive to redeem, not possessing features that hinder 
recapitalisation, having already been issued and paid in, not been sensitive or 
subject to credit vagaries, not been callable by issuer before the expiration of 5 
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years, must be subordinated to the usual stakeholders and debtors of the bank, 
attract purely discretionary dividends etc.283 
Tier 2 capital exists primarily to absorb loss on a ‘gone-concern basis’.284 This 
capital band comprises the sum of bank issued instruments not included in the 
definition of Tier 1 capital, stock surplus, instruments held by third parties upon 
issuance by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and which do not qualify as 
Tier 1 capital, loan losses as specified elsewhere in the accord, and ‘regulatory 
adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 capital’. The above mentioned 
instruments and considerations must meet minimum requirements to be 
classified for inclusion in Tier 2 capital. The criteria spelt out in the accord for 
inclusion as Tier 2 Capital are somewhat similar to those for inclusion as 
Additional Tier 1 Capital.285 
The reforms in Basel III include provision for adjustments to be made in the 
calculation of regulatory capital.286 For instance, intangibles (such as goodwill), 
deferred tax assets, cumulative gains and losses attributable to unforeseeable 
changes in own credit risk, investments in own shares, and profit from 
transactions related to securitisation are all excluded from the calculation.287 








The BCBS introduces additional capital buffers to serve as defences against 
losses in the event of crisis. The buffers introduced are the Capital Conservation 
Buffer (CCB) and a Countercyclical Buffer (CB). The Committee’s aim is to 
ensure that pools of capital are built during periods of stability so as to act as 
buffers in the event of losses as a result of crises.288 Hence, for the CCB, banks 
are should hold an additional 2.5% of their total Capital in the form of CET1 in 
addition to the 4.5% minimum – bringing the CET1 requirement to 7% of RWAs. 
Banks are allowed to go below the 7% threshold during periods of stress but 
must be rebuilt via reductions from discretionary distributions such as ‘decreases 
in dividend payments, share buy-backs, and staff bonus payments’.289The accord 
encourages domestic regulators to ensure the reductions are made until the buffer 
is re-established.290 The CB, on its part is to serve an additional pool of capital 
sourced from excesses in periods of very high credit growth.291 This buffer was 
introduced in response to the boom-boost cycle sequence credit availability tends 
to follow.  In times of strong credit growth, the temptation of an abundance of 
credit creates a loan frenzy fuel by increase in prices that readily create asset 
bubbles. When these bubbles burst, prices drop, borrowers default on their 
repayment obligations, and as a result banks cut back on lending. The 
introduction of the CB is to ensure that there is a pool from which banks can 
draw to check the depletion of funds available for lending. Hence the twin 







functions of this buffer is to act as check in periods of excessive credit 
availability and a means of bolstering credit availability in times of crisis.292  
Basel III places the task of determining the rate of credit growth and availability 
on national regulators. The measures to be used for this determination may be 
such objective measure as the GDP and if the regulators are of the opinion 'that 
credit has grown to be excessive’, the regulator may impose a CB of between 0% 
and 2.5% to be implemented within a 12 month period if banks fail to comply, 
the rational regulator may enforce compliance with restrictions on discretionary 
distributions. This discretionary buffer may be lifted if the regulator determines 
that the irregular build up has been checked.293 
Basel III introduces a leverage ratio (LR) to discourage excessive leveraging in 
the banking sector. The accord defines it as non-risk based and calibrated to be a 
‘credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements.’ The LR 
ensures that the banking system does not resort to deleveraging processes 
capable of destabilising the financial system. The LR is a non-risk based 
backstop tool which is calculated by putting Tier 1 capital against total exposure 
without factoring in RWAs. The aim is to arrive at an LR of at least 3%.294   
                                                          
292 See Peter King, Heath Tarbert, ‘Basel III: An Overview’ (2011) 30(5) BFSPR 1  
293 Bank for International Settlements Basel Committee On Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A 
global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’ (revised 2011) < 




Basel III provides for the capitalization and management of Counterparty Credit 
Risk (CCR). The accord stipulates an additional capital charge in anticipation of 
such losses as may be associated with depreciation in the creditworthiness of 
counterparties and increased risk weights on exposures to large financial 
institutions. 295  The Accord also provides for rather complex and wordy 
requirements concerning wrong way risk, Credit Valuation Adjustments (CVA), 
Expected Positive Exposure (EPE), and Central Counter Parties (CCP).296 
Under Basel II, banks could rely on ratings by External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs) in the assessment of risk weight. The result was banks relied 
entirely on the ratings of these institutions and completely desisted from carrying 
out internal risk-weight assessments. 297  Under Basel III however, banks are 
encouraged to carry out internal assessments of rated instruments and for an 
institution to function as an ECAI, its practices must be in compliance with the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies.298  
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The fresh addition to the Basel regime (apart from the LCR) in the Basel III 
reforms is the provision of liquidity standards. By way of response to the 
crushing liquidity squeeze experienced during the crisis, the BCBS through 
Basel III introduced uniform bank liquidity standards by way of the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). 299  The 
purpose of the LCR is to ensure that internationally active banks maintain 
adequately High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) which would be enough to 
withstand to both systemic and institution-specific shocks over a 30 day stress 
period. The anticipation is that in the event of such shocks as a sudden credit 
rating downgrade, significant loss of deposits, a sudden rise in secured funding 
haircuts, or calls on off-balance sheet exposures,  there should be ‘adequate stock 
of unencumbered HQLA that can be converted into cash easily and immediately 
in private markets to meet its liquidity needs’.300 Hence, in the short term, there 
will be the assurance of quick resilience in the face of sudden illiquidity shock.  
The LCR is a mitigating package introduced to strengthen a bank’s ability to 
absorb shock and insulate the real economy from contagion from the banking 
sector. The BCBS further introduced a list of monitoring tools to ensure strength 
and to promote global consistency in the supervision of liquidity risk and 
liquidity risk exposure of banks. 301In spite of the intentions of the BCBS in this 
regard, the sharp contrast in the treatment of retail and wholesale funding points 






at an unhealthy situation where competition grows for the types of funding that 
seem to enjoy leniency under the ration.302  
Since the LCR covers only a period of 30 days, Basel III provides for protection 
against longer term liquidity risk in the form of the NSFR. The NSFR establishes 
a minimum liquidity ratio determined from an assessment of a bank’s assets and 
activities.  The NSFR is intended to promote medium to long term funding over 
a one-year period of extended stress.303  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Upon its release and announcement, the most recent Basel accord has attracted 
mixed reactions. The debate still rages as to whether the accord is a step in the 
right direction and as to whether its lofty aims shall be achieved. Opinion on 
whether the accord will achieve its lofty aims is divided almost equally between 
optimistic patience and downright pessimism. Interestingly, this has been the 
response to the Basel regime as each of the previous accords have attracted a 
similar response. However, the outcry in this particular instance centred on 
possible negative outcomes from the stringency of its capital adequacy reforms, 
a possibility of a negative cost-benefit ratio of implementing the reforms, 
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shortcomings in the supervision of significantly sized institutions, and poor reach 
of the reforms in the area of systemic risk.304 Furthermore, it is thought that the 
accord fails to address the shortcomings of Basel II adequately and domestic 
regulations may be better suited to address the issues the accord seeks to fix.305 
The optimistic camp of commentators believes that the costs anticipated are 
overestimated and that justification for whatever costs the accord may attract will 
be worth its crisis preventive measures.306  
Even deeper and more significant is the debate regarding how well the attempt 
by the BCBS serves the effective regulation of international banks. An extension 
of this debate is how regulation is deployed in the prevention and amelioration of 
financial crises. The considerations of the next chapter capture reflections on 
these issues.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF THE ACCORD AND THE LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
The earlier chapters have either discussed or highlighted each of law, regulation, 
financial crises, international banking and its regulation, the global financial 
crisis which broke out in 2007, the emergence of the BCBS, and Basel III. This 
progression, as well as the subject-matters covered so far, is necessary to fully 
appreciate the emergence of the accord, the phenomenon it seeks to regulate, the 
considerations that should determine its provisions, and whether its aims are 
being met. To determine the efficacy of Basel III is to match its reform to the 
acts and omissions the causes of the global financial crisis reveal, while to gauge 
its ability to prevent a future crisis will entail attempting to match lessons 
distilled from the entire build-up and outbreak of the crisis with the reform of 
Basel III. 
An important concomitant of financial prudential regulation is supervision. 
Supervision ensures the stipulated rules are followed as well as serves as a data 
collation exercise since records of its activities provide a valuable store of 
information. As Basel III has the unique feature of merely stipulating 
supervisory guides and leaving the bulk of its supervision to local authorities,   
the important issue of implementation of the accord is germane to its success or 
otherwise. Since the accord is to be implementation with whatever adaptations 
the local authority deems fit and this implementation will invariably affect the 
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exact rules adopted and the supervisory standards to apply, the determination of 
the efficacy of the accord must involve a look at how this affects the reach and 
therefore, applicability of the accord. Furthermore, international financial 
regulation being a subset of international law, throws up an investigation of the 
role law plays in the globalized regulation of finance.  
This chapter investigates the crisis to highlight the lessons therefrom and pitches 
them against the reforms of the accord. Further, the role of law is gauged by 
examining the coercive quality of law that Basel III lacks. 
 
4.2 The Crisis, the Lessons, and the Accord 
To put the crisis in context, one must first appreciate the events surrounding the 
crash. In the summer of 2007, events that had built up over time came to a head 
and shook the very foundations of the financial and economic systems of the 
world. Beginning as early as 2006 with the gradual drop in the value of property 
in certain states in the U.S., the whirlwind would soon blow over right through 
the financial world and hit the real economy without mercy. The apparent 
catalyst, as well as final straw, in the build-up of events that eventually led to the 
credit crunch lies in the international and intra-national banking interests in 
fragile investments in securities tied  to risky sub-prime mortgage in the U.S. 
Factor in the availability of cheap credit in the build up to the crash and leading 
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international banks having adopted a high risk/ high reward model relying 
heavily on fast paced financial innovation and increased leveraging, the picture 
painted is that of a recipe for disaster. The crisis, like most others, is a complex 
mosaic of causes, incidents, and consequences. In the years leading up the crisis, 
Americans, who had become accustomed to cheap and easy credit stemming 
from policies previous decades indulged the age-long American attraction to 
homeownership by acquiring homes on mortgage irrespective of their 
creditworthiness. 307  These tendencies, encouraged by the predatory lending 
practices of banks and other lending institutions as well as an overabundance of 
credit caused the development of a credit bubble. A bubble built mostly on the 
back of the financial sector (particularly international banks) in the form of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) - one of the newer forms of securitization. 
The culpable species in this instance were privately issued MBSs that were 
pliable enough to be bundled up (subprime mortgages had been included from 
1997) into chunks for sale and trading. These securities and the Collaterized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) that could be created from them became a sort of 
staple investment for banks, hedge funds, and other investors.308 
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The actual unfolding of the crisis took the form of the reaction of the markets to 
defaults of subprime borrowers - perhaps not so much their reaction as the effect 
of these defaults. The first casualties were the hedge funds whose exposures 
were so huge that the entities folded and next the panic arose and spread to the 
retail sector with British bank, Northern Rock experiencing an otherwise 
uncharacteristic bank run. In quick succession three events occurred that 
confirmed the outbreak of a crisis; the U.S. government stepped in to rescue the 
North American financial giants Bear Sterns and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the investment banks, Lehman brothers collapsed, the U.S. government had to  
rescue and nationalize American International Group (AIG). At this point, the 
panic had already spread beyond North America and saw international banks 
scaling back on international loans. The squeeze was immediately felt by 
countries that depended heavily on these loans and the contagion spread globally 
mostly through effects on commodity prices and the collapse of exports.309  
This discussion above is a simplistic recounting of the unfolding of the crisis. 
However, what is not as easy to achieve is to pinpoint the exact cause or causes 
of the crisis. Since the outbreak of the crisis, a hefty and growing literature both 
from official government reports and academic post-crisis commentary has 
emerged explaining the events leading to and postulating on the cause or causes 
                                                          
309 See Adam Szyszka,’The genesis of the 2008 global financial crisis and challenges to the 
neoclassical paradigm of finance’ (2011) 22 GFJ 211; Wang, F. ; Zhang, Ting, ‘Financial 
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of the crisis. 310  This literature was lacking before the outbreak by way of 
warning of the events to come. There are a few claims of prediction of the events 
that manifested from the summer of 2007 but those may at best be discounted as 
warnings of a possibility of disruption (or to use the more technical term, 
correction) of a particular sector.311 A possible reason no one saw the crisis 
coming is that no virtually one could have envisaged the outcome of the factors 
and series of events that preceded the crisis. This is not to say crises are immune 
to prediction, but rather that this particular crisis occurred on the back of such 
diverse, deep rooted, and long running factors that it is unlikely that academics, 
policy makers, or regulators would have tied them together to arrive at the 
likelihood of a crisis of that magnitude. 312  However, while the argument 
concerning prediction remains debatable, consensus is building in a few areas of 
the causes with varying attribution of importance. It is noteworthy that a 
unanimous and comprehensive understanding of the crisis is still rudimentary at 
best. And as regulatory responses are usually modelled on causal connections 
with past economic events and future anticipation, any hasty introduction of 
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sweeping reforms before ascertaining that said reforms are targeted at correct 
causal elements tends to be a neglect of an important foundational step.313  
An inclusive list of virtually every conceivable head of cause of the crisis 
includes imprudent mortgage lending, housing bubble, global imbalances, 
securitization, lack of transparency and accountability in mortgage finance, 
rating agencies, mark-to-market accounting, shadow banking system, non-bank 
runs, off-balance sheet finance, government-mandated sub-prime lending, failure 
of risk management systems, financial innovation, complexity, human frailty, 
bad computer models, excessive leverage, relaxed regulation of leverage, Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS), over-the-counter derivatives, fragmented regulation, no 
systemic risk regulator, short-term incentives, tail risk, and the black swan: the 
impact of the highly improbable.314 An examination of the causes of the crisis is 
done in the third chapter of this thesis and need not be repeated here. The lessons 
to be learnt therefrom however are not as obvious as the causes but may be 
gleaned from them.  
Perhaps the most prominent lesson from the crisis debacle is that as a result of 
liberalization, globalization and technological advancements, the world is now a 
lot more interwoven in its affairs and the transfer of contagion in the financial 
sector has become a real and an ever growing risk. A case in point is the liberal 
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approach the U.S. Federal Reserve adopted with regard to its monetary policies 
and the far reaching consequences the resultant boom in real estate purchases in 
the U.S. had in the run up to the global crisis.315An important lesson is the 
importance of the regulation of banks and their activities. Despite the age old 
precept concerning the need for the strict regulation of banks316, the crisis served 
to reiterate this point in light of the practices rife in banks in the build up to the 
crisis.317 Prior to the crisis, banks, especially internationally active ones, had 
developed models which took advantage of the relaxation of regulatory 
restrictions in the sector. These relaxed regulations were mostly either for taking 
advantage of competitive advantages or in enhancement of seemingly booming 
economic results suggested in the astronomical profits posted by financial 
institutions. Hence, the stage for a systemic crisis was set on the back of banks’ 
misuse of liquidity, cheap credit, leverage, off balance sheet lending, and term 
risk mismatches. 318  Another lesson of the crisis is in the area of the 
macroeconomic thought that informs an existing financial system. The 
commentary and discussion prompted by the outbreak of the crisis focused more 
on describing what had happened with the hope of arriving at an explanation for 
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it and looking to devise measures to ensure there is no reoccurrence than 
examining the evolution and nuances of macroeconomic thought that preceded 
the crisis.319 The crisis manifested heavy dependence on a free market paradigm 
that gave undue discretion to market participants manage their activities. This 
free market paradigm fed irresponsibility and greed evidenced by unjustifiable 
managerial compensation structures, as well as, endless and poorly regulated 
financial innovation to create a financial system that Roubini and Mihm describe 
as more sub-prime than the mortgages that precipitated the crisis.320  
In the wisdom of the BCBS, the best strategy - by way of regulatory response - 
was to strengthen capital buffers and contain leverage in the banking system.321 
The BCBS claims the reforms introduced will operate ‘as part of a considered 
process that balances the objective of maintaining a vibrant, competitive banking 
sector in good times against the need to enhance the sector's resilience in future 
periods of financial and economic stress’.322 With its somewhat understandably 
rudimentary understanding of the exact causes of the crisis, the thrust of the 
BCBS’s response is aimed at striking a balance between maintaining vibrancy in 
the banking sector and putting in place, preventive devices and measures in 
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anticipation of future occurrences. The examination of the reforms of Basel III 
shall cover each of its three pillars namely capital adequacy, risk management, 
and market discipline. Also a look is had at the newly introduced liquidity 
standards.   
The steps taken under the accord regarding capital are already controversial. The 
accord characteristically (same as under Basel II) increases, significantly, the 
amount and quality of internationally active banks’ regulatory capital. While on 
some quarters there are calls for the levels set to be reviewed upwards, others 
hold that it is too high as it is and should be reduced.323 There is arguments that 
increasing minimum capital requirements for banks will attract social costs. 
Banks and other stakeholders do not hold this view. The discussions of the 
concerns surrounding policies should focus fully on the costs and benefits of 
each position for the economy i.e. whether the economy, as opposed to a specific 
group, benefits or suffers.324 As a rule of thumb, capital requirements should 
reduce procyclical effects during a down turn.325 
Under Basel II, banks could rely on ratings by External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs) in the assessment of risk weight. The result was banks relied 
entirely on the ratings of these institutions and completely desisted from carrying 
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out internal risk-weight assessments which led to the horrifying results 
witnessed. 326   Under Basel III however, banks are encouraged to carry out 
internal assessments of rated instruments and for an institution to function as an 
ECAI, its practices must be in compliance with the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit 
Rating Agencies. 327   This is a welcome development which sadly may be 
plagued by implementation issues.  
The next pillar covers market discipline. In banking, market discipline describes 
the countervailing actions private sector participants take as a result of rising 
costs attributable to banks’ risky behaviour.328 The BCBS had suggested types of 
public disclosures to be released regularly by banks. These include details of 
capital held as buffer by banks against losses and the exposures that may result 
in said losses.329 Market discipline may be used by regulatory authorities either 
directly or indirectly. Direct market discipline involves the collation of germane 
information on market participants. It is a substitution of prudential supervision 
of bank management. On the other hand, indirect market discipline compliments 
prudential supervision by encouraging stakeholders to ensure proper bank 
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management by monitoring from their position. 330  Indirect market discipline 
depends on material market information and tends to impose more transparency 
in the activity of the market participant. It also improves the efficiency of 
supervision.331 
There is evidence that market discipline is beneficial with regard to risks. Both 
equity and credit risks tend to reduce with market discipline.332 However, there is 
also evidence that market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. Market 
discipline weakens more where bank regulation favours it before the crisis and 
more in countries with strong institutions.333 The disclosures envisaged under the 
market discipline pillar of Basel III have not been proven to meet any of the ends 
expected either with regard to content or timeliness of disclosures.334  
The newest revelation in the accord in the new liquidity standards introduced. 
Liquidity is the lifeblood banks. So fundamental is liquidity that it may be 
concluded it is the basis of the existence of banks. Banks perform the function of 
maturity transformation by accepting short term demand deposits and providing 
loans to households and businesses on a longer term basis. The risk in this vital 
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function of banks is that depositors may demand more than is left over in the 
bank after the loans given out. This is liquidity risk. The mitigation of this risk 
may be by maintaining a significant pool of liquid assets to meet obligations as 
they arise, especially in a tight squeeze such a crisis scenario.335 A further risk of 
illiquidity is the likelihood of spillage onto other banks when it occurs. 
Imprudent liquidity management may pose serious difficulty for banks system-
wide and may evolve into a complete crumble in financial intermediation.336 The 
perfect demonstration of the contagious nature of illiquidity is the spread of 
illiquidity during the 2007 crisis the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. The BCBS’ introduction of the LCR and NSFR are to ensure there is 
adequate high quality liquid assets to offset crucial liquidity needs in the short 
term and an on-going basis respectively. 337 The intention of any introduction of 
liquidity standards is to ensure that banks have in store, adequate liquid assets to 
withstand sudden and sustained liquidity requirements such as bank runs in a 
crisis situation while also ensuring that banks’ funding sources are liquid enough 
to not freeze under pressure of crisis.338 It must be noted at this juncture that the 
higher the liquidity ratios that are held, the lower interest from loans will be, 
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while low liquidity provision increases the risk of illiquidity. 339  The newly 
introduced LCR provides for a differentiation in funding sources. The rules are 
such that there is a bias in the treatment of more volatile sources as wholesale 
funding than other less volatile ones as retail ones. The effect of this 
differentiation is counterproductive as it could serve to undermine the banks’ 
stability.340 
The discussion on the impact Basel III capital reforms will have on both banks 
and the economy serve short-term goals as they were created to address the most 
apparent perceived cracks in the system. However longer-term will definitely 
require accompanying tweaking of business models, processes (which 
themselves must by prudently managed) to prevent possible shortage of capital 
and the accompanying costs.  Further to this is the fear that any shortage of 
capital may cause contraction of the economy by a reduction in economic 
activities.341 Ultimately, and beyond the reforms themselves, are the hurdles that 
may arise in terms of the extent of international cooperation expected in the 
implementation of the accord. If the responses by domestic regulators and, to an 
extent, the causes in terms of the build-up to the crisis in such areas as corporate 
governance standards, securities regulations etc. are anything to go by, then the 
implementation of the accord may suffer a similar fate as its predecessors. 
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4.3 Law to the Rescue? 
The debate on what law is, and what its true purpose in society is has been 
extensively debated and argued by great and able minds so much that an addition 
to this is unnecessary.342 However, this research provided a few basic functions 
in the first chapter.343 There is no need to reproduce them here nor is there a need 
to justify them. Law, as a concept, depends heavily on its own ability to effect its 
own stipulations and by so doing create a sort of legitimacy in its existence, and 
validity. This self-justifying ability is the basis of the order law establishes and 
maintains in the modern society. The demonstration of its legitimacy by an 
ability to utilise coercion to enforce its stipulations reinforces the conviction of 
its subjects that it is valid.344 Basel III is an attempt at international law, which 
does not conform to this resort to coercion. Even though they were not formally 
binding, the earlier Basel accords were adopted by member countries of the 
BCBS and a good number of non-member countries. 345  In any event, the 
implementation has always been plagued. On one hand is the non-uniformity of 
the implementation as states are allowed to vary the provisions they adopt and on 
                                                          
342 See generally Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa, Philosophical foundations of the nature 
of law (Oxford University Press 2013)  
343 See Joseph Raz, The authority of law: Essays on law and morality (Oxford Scholarship 
Online March 2012) 
344 See Mahir Muharemovic, ‘Anatomy of the Law’ (2017) 4 SP-JLTP 9 
345 See Daniel E. Ho, ‘Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement 
the Basel Accord? (2002) 5 JIEL 647 
116 
 
the other is the resistance of stallholders and states alike.346 This has created a 
void in the applicability of the accord.  
In the search for law to fill this void the obvious choice is international law. 
However, by its very nature, international law does not concern itself with 
economic issues. The origins of international law lie in conflict; it has always 
catered primarily for issues of peace and the procedure to adopt in the absence of 
peace i.e. conflict situations. Changes are beginning to emerge and its ambit is 
spreading to bi-lateral or geographical promotion of mutual economic prosperity 
by way of treaties. But these trade and investment treaties more or less merely 
remove matters from being resolved by diplomacy to the certainty of rulings or 
judgements of tribunals.347 These are basically the extent to which legalization is 
applicable to international economic law. 348  There is no treaty in place for 
financial crisis response or regulation of crisis.349 
The BCBS is an example of a body that exists and exercises powers to make 
international law. The BCBS is so noted for this power and its acts (accords) that 
command relatively high compliance such that writers have branded the 
regulations that result from it as ‘Basel Brand’. The BCBS, which comprises 
                                                          
346 See Daniel K Tarullo ‘Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation’ 
(Peterson Institute of International Economics 2008) 
347 See Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, ‘Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions’ (2010) 54 ISQ 1  
348 See Axel Berger, ‘The Politics of China's Investment Treaty-Making Program’, in Tomer 
Broude, Marc L Busch, Amelia Porges (eds), The Politics of International Economic Law 
( Cambridge University Press 2011) 
349 Eric J Pan, ‘Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial 
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks’(2010) 11 CJIL 243 
117 
 
central bank heads of a comity of nations, exemplifies the informal, exclusive 
but dominating informal setting under which international law has evolved. This 
‘new governance’ model completely negates the traditional top-down, direct and 
control model. Another characteristic of this model is that the actors are usually 
non-state stakeholders or informal institutions which taking take advantage of 
their informality to make these laws on an ongoing basis in response to changes 
that arise and this mobile accumulation increases the store of knowledge in that 
sector or field.350 Hence, some describe the BCBS as a transnational regulatory 
network. These are informal multilateral fora consisting contemporary 
representatives representing states’ regulatory agencies to help facilitate 
‘multilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the authority of the 
participants.’351  
A few sceptics of the classification of international law as ‘real’ law hold that by 
its fundamental nature, international law is capable of just a negligible power of 
independent influence over state action or inaction. 352  A long litany of 
unaddressed high profile violations of treaties seems to suggest international law 
is barely worthy of the tag law. However, the passage of time’ pivotal incidents’ 
and the emergence of new knowledge have led to a rethink of what the law 
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consists in the international sense. Hence a rethink has emerged of the 
traditional, hard-line conception of international law based heavily on the 
doctrine of sources with its ‘focus on consent and formality’ and an 
overemphasis on treaty creation has given way to conceptions that emphasize an 
alternative to the creation of truly international law.353  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The efficacy of the accord itself, irrespective of the responses from and views of 
academics, state level policy makers, researchers, and other commentators, 
depends ultimately on how much the reforms reflect solutions to the actions and 
omissions that constitute the causes of the crisis.  In addition, there should be an 
unambiguous reflection of improvements on the preceding accords which will 
itself show an understanding and reflection of changes in financial practices and 
regulation. The need for this clear improvements is underscored by the perceived  
shortcomings in the areas of stringency of its capital adequacy reforms, the 
relative high cost-benefit ratio of implementing the reforms, the neglect of 
provisions regarding too big to fail institutions, and the poor reach of the reforms 
in the area of systemic risk.354  Fears regarding the reforms being no more than 
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mere ‘rhetoric’ in the area of improvements on Basel II also underscore the need 
for the Basel III to be real and tangible improvement on its predecessor.355 
Finally, the stringency of its reforms may generate exorbitant costs.356 The hope 
of the BCBS is that the reforms become more than sterile improvements on 
Basel II and not a potential recipe for a future asset bubble.357  
Understanding of the crisis remains somewhat unsettled and regulatory responses 
are usually modelled on causal connections with past economic events and future 
anticipation. Hasty introduction of sweeping reforms before ascertaining the 
reforms are targeting the correct causes is a waste of time and gross neglect of an 
important factor. The BCBS and its work358 which should be a blessing seems 
more like a burden by consistently coming short of targets for a variety of 
reasons prominent among which is uniformity and eagerness in terms of 
implementation. This is hardly surprising since certain states which had accepted 
the earlier Basel requirements had been put in a disadvantage where non-
compliant states were. And further to this is the fact that the more the restrictions 
in banking, the lower profits will be. The greater the powers a financial 
institution has, the more it’ll take on tasks that are profitable. So regulation 
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decreases profitability.359 And as international banks are part of the private sector, 
it is easy to imagine they will resist to the extent they are capable of. 
As globalization, financial innovation, and technology advancement continue, 
the reforms will require more international coordination. The threat in this is the 
discountenance of macroeconomic considerations.  The monetary system 
contributed to this crisis just as much as the structure and regulation of the 
existing financial system but the reach of Basel III does not cover. Macro-
economic policies, especially wrong ones like those in place before the crisis, 
may impose undue stress/pressure on financial markets leading to stress and 
financial crises. Financial crises lead to economic woes and further macro-
economic policies which may require loosening the grip of regulation or 
disposing of them altogether, are required to fix economic woes. Hence a holistic 
view is needed to ensure success. It may be that monetary policy changes are 
desirable to prevent a financial crises - even more so than direct introduction of 
financial regulation. 360 
It is not all bad. As far as responses go Basel III is a good start. There needed to 
be a response. Any response would be better than none at all. Howbeit, the 
accord will benefit from ongoing monitoring and adjustments which are needed 
to address the lessons from the crisis and tackle systemic risk. This is not a call 
for further regulation. The area is as complex as it could be and further 
                                                          




regulation will not help – more so if the new regulations turn out to complex. 
Fixing complex banking by instituting equally complex regulation will not help. 
Theoretically, this is unsound. In reality, crisis shows us in bright colours that it 
is unwise. The role of financial regulation is simply to set reasonable limits 
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This research has examined Basel III to determine its ability will live up to its 
aims to protect the global economy from another crisis of the magnitude of the 
global financial crisis. The research also examines the role of law in the 
regulation of financial crises at the global level and how law could contribute to 
this task. The subject matters in the discussions herein are law, regulation, 
international banking, financial crises, and international financial regulation. 
The discussions reveal how International banking, in some form or other, has 
been around for well over one millennium. Its growth ties closely with maritime 
trade and the contribution of enterprising European families who established 
presence and practices in leading financial cities. While modern international 
banking is a mixture of practices and devices developed over centuries and has 
become very important in the global financial architecture, attempts to regulate 
international banking only began in earnest in the 1970s with the creation of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which was set up in response 
to a series of heretofore bank crashes and scandals.362 The committee’s primary 
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remit is setting standards for internationally active banks. In addition, the 
committee tackles crises that originate from or affect international banking.363  
An international bank is one that carries out banking functions in more than one 
country. Being that these banks are an important part of international finance and 
their importance continues to grow especially as liberalisation encourages 
innovation in finance and advancements in information and communications 
technology continues, their stability is of crucial importance to global financial 
stability. Apart from being primary a source of funds and information, 
international banks are active in the financial markets of the countries where they 
operate.  This local level participation may be a conduit for the transfer of risk or 
contagion. Systemic risk therefore, is the primary motivation for attempts to 
regulate international banking as well as the primary driver of any form of 
international financial regulation. 364 
The fear of the outbreak and spread of financial crisis informs most financial 
regulation. A financial crisis is a sudden crash in a financial system that impairs 
its functionality. Some symptoms are a drop in asset value and panicked 
withdrawal of funds from financial institutions. Debate as to whether there is an 
in-built tendency in economies to crash as a corrective measure after a period of 
excesses or whether crises represent nothing more than the effect of interference 
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in an otherwise self-regulating economy is still ongoing.365  The global financial 
crisis of 2007 is a reflection of the complexity of modern finance. The causative 
factors of the crisis are myriad and unsettled but the ultimate catalysts in the 
form of the bubble that developed around practices in sub-prime lending in the 
United States, together with an ever-growing financial globalisation, points to an 
interconnectedness in the financial sphere of the world that increases the 
likelihood of systemic crises.366 The global financial crisis and the economic 
meltdown represent an instance of the correction in Minsky’s hypothesis.367  
Basel III was released to shore up internationally active banks against failure by 
beefing up their capital requirements and introducing liquidity buffers. It is a 
truism that regulation is beneficial in checking the outbreak and spread of 
financial crisis through international banking but Basel III, even though a step in 
the right direction, will neither prevent another global financial crisis nor 
guarantee financial stability. International banking regulation will always lag 
behind advancements in international banking. Banking is a day-to-day activity 
and devices are developed to either deal with challenges or to break into new 
frontiers, while so far the BCBS, even though it tends to keep track of 
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developments in the sector, usually and has so far been reactionary in its 
regulatory efforts. Again, the occurrence of financial crises is inevitable and so 
more focus should be on early containment than prevention. The magnitude or 
subtype of crisis may vary but the mere occurrence is certain.368 This argument is 
based partly on the financial instability hypothesis of Hyman Minsky as well as 
research in investor behaviour.369 However, the debate on the theorization of 
financial crises is still unsettled and at every given point an influential writer or 
research gains traction and hold sway until a subsequent crisis swings 
momentum away onto a new and more appealing description or theory. In 
practice however, the introduction of new regulation trails far behind financial 
innovation. Furthermore, there are established behavioural economics principles 
such as greed, loss aversion, herding etc. which affect the actions of financial 
market participants. This combines with the lag between regulation and 
innovation to ensure the occurrence of future crises.370 
                                                          
368 See Claessens, S and Kose, M A, ‘Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications’ 
(2013) (IMF WP/13/28); Brunnermeier, M., Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information: 
Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis and Herding (Oxford University Press 2001)  
368 See Stephen G Cecchetti, Marion Kohler, and Christian Upper, ‘Financial Crises and 
Economic Activity, (August 2009) available from <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp05.pdf> 
accessed 3 October 2017; Kenneth J Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics 
(St. Martin's Press 1985); Stephen G Cecchetti, Marion Kohler, and Christian Upper, 
‘Financial Crises and Economic Activity, (August 2009) <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp05.pdf> 
accessed 3 October 2017; Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and 
Economics (St. Martin's Press 1985) 
369 See Ekanshi Gupta,  Preeti bedi, and Poonam lakra, ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis V/S 
Behavioural Finance’ (April 2014) 16(4) JBM 56 
370 See Rudin, Joshua, ‘Basel III: the banking band-aid?’ (2012) 6(2) BJCFCL 621; Carmen M. 
Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons 
Learned and Those Forgotten’ in Stijn Claessens, M Ayhan Kose, Luc Laeven, and Fabian 
Valencia (eds) FINANCIAL CRISES Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses( IMF 2014) 
126 
 
Basel III is a step forward but the BCBS is condemned to a reflexive relationship 
with crises. If we acknowledge regulation as a viable response to financial crisis 
to either contain its spread or assuage its effects and hold that financial crises are 
inevitable in the present global financial structure, then the natural conclusion 
would be that there is the likelihood of another crisis and another Basel accord in 
response to that.371 
The role of law in a given state is fundamentally different from the concept of 
law at the international level. Law barely exists at the international level and the 
reach of international law as it is will not satisfy the needs law of international 
financial regulation. Regulation differs from law as the law includes the means 
of enforcement of both legal rules and regulation and is the totality of the 
machinery that creates a relationship that enables regulation and its enforcement. 
However, international law is incapable  law also stands as an arbiter in instances 
where legal rules, as opposed to regulation that may be voluntary, clashes with 
the collective expectations of the society.372  
As the world trudges forward in search of a stable and productive financial 
architecture, should the world simply await the next global crisis and release 
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another accord in response? Suggestions abound about introducing 
fundamentally different measures for international financial regulation. These 
have ranged from calling from a new body to embracing the treaty dependence 
of international law and even to structural changes in the BCBS. Perhaps if the 
composition of the BCBS were expanded to include members from more than 
the present 26 and involved other professionals apart from central bank heads. 
Even though there are compelling reasons for the continued existence of the 
undemocratic standard setting activities of the BCBS. These includes that the G-
10 nations are arguably the most experienced in terms of ‘regulation of large, 
complex financial markets, which makes them the most obvious sources of 
sound financial laws’ and very few outside of this group have the expertise to 
establish an institution like the BCBS. Moreover, these G-10 members have 
more at stake not only as a result of the investments they must have in these 
institution but also because the much touted integration and interconnectedness 
of banks and markets in that cadre. As a matter of fact, lesser economies tend to 
depend heavily on the stability of these more developed nations to help in their 
development agenda. These factors tend to have made the continued existence of 
the BCBS a success.373 Notwithstanding, let’s assume a new agency is formed 
with list of flexible but relevant areas for regulation open enough to 
accommodate nuances which may require special treatment. Financial 
                                                          
373 See Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn't)’ (2011) 




institutions are run by people whose emotions seep into their decisions whether 
intentionally or unwittingly. This could be human psychology. Without needing 
enforcement powers, this body would still empowered to point out questionable 
practices and bring them to public knowledge and scrutiny. The result would be 
the erring economy of party may resort to fix the issue or publicly prove 
innocence as nobody likes to be blamed for untrue allegations and investors are 
likely to withdraw therefrom and cost the erring party a lot. Furthermore, the 
regulators may be forced to address the issues since they will be public in the 
first place.374 Also the erring party may be tempted to investigate the accusation 
and fix the issues if they have merit. The public opprobrium of mismanagement, 
incautious attitude to possible complications, and the stain of impropriety if they 
ignore these allegations will force the errant to act. The plan is to ensure globally, 
there is cautious and timely effort to avoid a crash. The hope now is that the 
BCBS become more representative of the realities of the divergences both in 
microeconomic orientation and peculiar economic needs and objectives of 
countries of the world. Also, the more representative committee should be 
engaged in the drawing up of a more reflective accord that each country should 
strive for. Also, there should be a measure of regulatory flexibility to enable each 
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country achieve the ends of the accord by its own means. Also, the creation of a 
machinery375 for the investigation of practices and products worldwide to allow 
for tailor-made statements for each country would be an advantage. If these are 
done, a bridge connecting regulators, the public and bankers will be built. Flaws 
will be checked before they cause problems and public participation may offer 
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